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ABSTRACT
STATISTICAL ANOMALY DENIAL OF SERVICE AND
RECONNAISSANCE INTRUSION DETECTION
by
Zheng Zhang
This dissertation presents the architecture, methods and results of the Hierarchical
Intrusion Detection Engine (HIDE) and the Reconnaissance Intrusion Detection
System (RIDS); the former is denial-of-service (DoP) attack detector while the latter
is a scan and probe (P&P) reconnaissance detector; both are statistical anomaly
systems.
The HIDE is a packet-oriented, observation-window using, hierarchical, multi-
tier, anomaly based network intrusion detection system, which monitors several
network traffic parameters simultaneously, constructs a 64-bin probability density
function (PDF) for each, statistically compares it to a reference PDF of normal
behavior using a similarity metric, then combines the results into an anomaly status
vector that is classified by a neural network classifier. Three different data sets
have been utilized to test the performance of HIDE; they are OPNET simulation
data, DARPA'98 intrusion detection evaluation data and the CONEX TESTBED
attack data. The results showed that HIDE can reliably detect DoP attacks with
high accuracy and very low false alarm rates on all data sets. In particular, the
investigation using the DARPA'98 data set yielded an overall total misclassification
rate of 0.13%, false negative rate of 1.42%, and false positive rate of 0.090%; the
latter implies a rate of only about 2.6 false alarms per day.
The RIDS is a session oriented, statistical tool, that relies on training to model
the parameters of its algorithms, capable of detecting even distributed stealthy
reconnaissance attacks. It consists of two main functional modules or stages: the
Reconnaissance Activity Profiler (RAP) and the Reconnaissance Alert Correlater
(RAC). The RAP is a session-oriented module capable of detecting stealthy scanning
and probing attacks, while the RAC is an alert-correlation module that fuses the RAP
alerts into attack scenarios and discovers the distributed stealthy attack scenarios.
RIDS has been evaluated against two data sets: (a) the DARPA'98 data, and (b) 3
weeks of experimental data generated using the CONEX TESTBED network. The
RIDS has demonstrably achieved remarkable success; the false positive, false negative
and misclassification rates found are low, less than 0.1%, for most reconnaissance
attacks; they rise to about 6% for distributed highly stealthy attacks; the latter is
a most challenging type of attack, which has been difficult to detect effectively until
now.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background in Intrusion Detection
The ubiquity of the Internet allows attackers to pose serious threats on the security
of computer infrastructures and the integrity of sensitive data. Computer-based
intrusions in the form of a series of malicious activities typically target computer
systems or the services that a host provides. The attackers often aim to obtain
unauthorized privileges or to downgrade or block the availability of the services.
Computer attacks may be classified into the following categories [1]:
Reconnaissance Attacks are actions initiated by attackers to probe a victim
network for vulnerable servers and possible penetrating points.
Denial-of-Service Attacks are destructive attempts to interrupt or degrade the
services provided by the system so that legitimate users are denied from
accessing these services.
Privilege Escalation Attacks are attacks through which an attacker illegally
escalates his privilege level to access and control the victim system.
Data Intercept/Alternation Attacks are activities that aim to intercept and
alter sensitive data without the authorizations to do so.
System Use Attacks are actions to hijack the victim system for some other
unauthorized usage, such as converting the host into an FTP server to store
pirated music, or using the system as a staging point to launch attacks on other
systems.
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are designed to automatically detect these
malicious activities against a computer or a computer network.
Intrusion detection has been an active field of research for more than two decades
since James Anderson published his ground-breaking paper about computer security
in 1980 [2]. In 1987, Dorothy Denning [3] laid the methodological framework to detect
computer-based intrusions. The basic assumptions of intrusion detections are:
1
2• The behaviors of users and programs are observable and can be modeled from
various types of audit data, for example, from system logs or from network
traffic;
• Moreover, by finely tuning the system, intrusive activities can be differentiated
and identified from normal activities.
Intrusion detection techniques can be broadly partitioned into two
complementary approaches: cisuse detection, and anocaly detection. Misuse
detection systems, such as [4,5], model the known attacks and scan the audit data for
the occurrences of these specific patterns. Anomaly detection systems, such as [6, 7],
flag intrusions by observing significant deviations from typical or expected behavior
of the system or users.
The majority of the intrusion detection systems are developed following either
one or the both of these two approaches. For example, SNORT [8], Bro [9] and
JAM [5] are misuse detection systems; IDES [10] and INBOUND [11] detect attacks
based on anomalies; some other systems, such as NIDES [12] and CMDS [13], use
both misuse and anomaly techniques to detect attacks.
1.2 Dissertation Approach
This dissertation describes the studies on
The application of probability density function (PDF) statistics and neural
network classification in the fields of anocaly intrusion detection and alert
correlation.
More specifically, this dissertation aims to answer the following questions:
• Can PDF statistics be used for anomaly intrusion detection?
• What is the achievable performance of an IDS by using PDF statistics in
anomaly intrusion detection systems?
• How do different classification algorithms perform in detecting network-based
attacks?
3• How well can distributed, stealthy probing and scanning attacks be identified
using PDF statistics and neural classifiers?
Differing from most contemporary intrusion detection systems, which model
user and attacker activities using statistical counters about system utilization and
the frequencies of interesting events, this dissertation proposes a novel approach to
represent statistical features in the formats of Probability Density Functions (called
PDF from now on), to compare the observed parameters with the reference models
using PDF similarity metrics, and to classify the measured similarity distances using
neural networks.
These PDF statistics and neural classification approaches are also applied
to detect stealthy probing and scanning attacks, whose objectives are to gather
important information, such as network topologies, services and vulnerabilities, about
a victim network.
Two intrusion detection prototypes have been designed and implemented to
validate this proposed "PDF/neural network" approach:
HIDE (or Hierarchical Intrusion Detection Engine) is an anomaly intrusion detection
system, with hierarchical architecture, that utilizes PDF statistical models and
neural classifiers to detect Denial-of-Service (DoP) attacks.
RIDS (or Reconnaissance Intrusion Detection System) is a session-oriented,
statistical anomaly detection system that detects probing and scanning (PAS)
reconnaissance attacks. It consists of two main function modules: the
reconnaissance activity profiler (RAP) for P&S attack detection and the
reconnaissance activity correlater (RAC) for alert and scenario correlation.
1.3 Basic Concepts
Some basic terminologies of intrusion detection, which will be extensively used
throughout this dissertation, will be first introduced in this section. The criteria
in evaluating intrusion detection systems are described in the following subsection.
41.3.1 Terminologies
Intrusion is "any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of a resource" [14].
Event is the unit of analysis, or the granularity, of an IDS (see Section 2.5 for more
discussions). In HIDE, an event is defined as all the packets that are observed
within a time window. In RAP, an event is defined as a session state transition.
In RAC, an event is defined as an alert generated by RAP.
Intrusion Detection is a process to automatically detect and alarm when an
intrusion is taking place.
Attack Scenario is a sequence of attacks that an attacker launches in order to
achieve certain purposes.
Alert is a warning message that an IDS generates when it finds that an intrusion is
undergoing.
Alert Correlation is a procedure that automatically correlates alerts based on their
similarities; it also rebuilds the attack scenarios so that more contextual and
environmental information could be provided to administrators.
PDF Statistics is a set of statistical algorithms about how to represent the
distribution of descriptive and representational parameters of the system under
monitoring and how to statistically compare two distributions.
Detection Classifier is the algorithm that an intrusion detection system uses to
classify the input data into either normal or anomalous category based on the
knowledge it learned from the training data.
1.3.2 Evaluation Criteria
The performance of an intrusion detection system is generally evaluated by the
following two quantities:
True Positive Rate (or detection rate) is the rate that an attack event will be
detected. An ideal IDS is expected to operate at detection rates as close to 1
as possible. In the remaining of this dissertation, the detection rates are also
represented as "TPR".
False Positive Rate (or false alarm rate) is the rate that normal events will be
mistakenly classified as attacks. False alarm rates are expected to be close to
0. In the rest of this dissertation, the false alarm rates are noted as "APR".
These two criteria are intertwined, and in general it is not possible to
simultaneously achieve a TPR of 1 and a APR of 0. Therefore, for IDSs with
5adjustable detection thresholds, Receiver Operating Characteristic curves are also
used to evaluate the system performance:
Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (or ROC curve) is the curve of FPR
vs. TPR at various detection thresholds. The area below the curve represents
the probability of correctly distinguishing a (normal, attack) pair. A sample
ROC curve is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The point at the upper left corner
corresponds to the optimal detection threshold with high detection rate and
low false alarm rate.
Figure 1.1 A sample ROC curve.
In this dissertation, another quantity is also used to represent the system
performance.
Misclassification Rate is the probability that an observation could be mistakenly
classified. It is calculated as the ratio between the number of misclassifications,
including both false positives and false negatives, and the total number of
observations. In the rest of this dissertation, misclassification rate is also
symbolized as ERR.
The misclassification rate can be regarded as the metric describing the overall
classification performance. It may be used as the objective function to train all
classifiers tested in this dissertation.
61.4 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized in the following way.
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts and the state of art in information
security, intrusion detection, alert correlation and the issues on intrusion detection
evaluation.
Chapter 3 describes the system architecture and the statistical model of HIDE.
The classification results of HIDE on three independent test data sets are also reported
in this chapter.
Chapter 4 reports the research to identify and select feature sets important for
HIDE to detect DoS attacks.
Chapter 5 presents the systematic studies on various approaches to optimize
the detection performance of HIDE, which includes the PDA partitioning schemes,
the distribution similarity metrics, the classification algorithms, and the application
of Wavelet compressions.
Chapter 6 presents two different methodologies to train the neural classifiers
based on the attack and background traffic information collected from a controlled test
network and the background traffic information collected from a production network.
Chapter 7 introduces the algorithms, the architectures and the experimental
results of the proposed reconnaissance intrusion systems.
Chapter 8 summarizes this dissertation and outlines future work.
Appendix A lists the statistical features monitored by HIDE, RAP and RAC,
and provides a description of each feature.
Appendix B briefly introduces the network topology, the related traffic
emulation software and the attack label tools of the CONEX TESTBED network.
CHAPTER 2
INTRUSION DETECTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Information Security
Similar to other business and financial assets, the computation and information
resources are also valuable assets of an organization. Therefore they should be
appropriately protected. The main attributes of the computer and network security
are commonly referred to as CIA [15]:
Confidentiality : to keep sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.
Integrity : to protect sensitive information from unauthorized modification.
Availability : to prevent the unauthorized withholding of information and resources.
Josson [16] added another feature to this list with regard to the usage of
information:
Accountability : to avoid the unauthorized use of computation resources.
The goal of information assurance is to prevent these four aspects of security
from being violated. A computer-based intrusion is a series of malicious activities
that target a computer or network system or services in order to compromise their
security. Halme et al. [17] listed six general, non-exclusive approaches to anti-intrusion
techniques to protect an organization from attacks:
• Preecption: To strike against the security threat before it has had a chance to
launch its attack. This pro-active measure is difficult to practice since most of
the attacks cannot be foreseen.
• Prevention: To preclude or significantly reduce the possibility of the success
of a particular intrusion. Examples of this approach are "user identification
and authorization" , "access control" and "information encryption" . These
prevention approaches are necessary but far from sufficient since, as systems
become ever more complex, there are always exploitable weaknesses in the
systems due to various design and programming errors. The enormous bugs and
the wide spreading virus and worms targeting such bugs in Windows operating
systems are obvious examples.
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8• Deterrence: To intimidate attackers to hold off their attacks in fear of increasing
risks and the negative consequences. Of course, if the protected resources are
highly important, or if the perpetrations are unlikely to be caught, the attackers
may not be scared off so easily.
• Detection: To identify intrusion attempts, so that the proper response can
be evoked. It also can provide the important information of the incidents to
administrator and proper authority for damage recovery and for tracing the
perpetrator.
• Deflection: To divert an intruder to a pre-designed controlled "honey pot" so
that no real damage could be caused, and to lure the intruder into believing
that he has succeeded. The main difficulty for this approach is that to set up
the "honey pot" realistically enough to fool an experienced attacker is far from
easy.
• Counterceasures: To actively respond against intrusions while they are in
progress. Common practices include "blocking the traffic from firewall" ,
"disabling the user account" and, in some extreme cases, "shutting down
the system temporarily" . The effectiveness of the countermeasures is highly
dependent on the accuracy of intrusion detections. An erroneous action on a
normal user could deny the user's legitimate access to the services.
These anti-intrusion techniques may cooperate with each other to form multi-
layered protection of the system resources, Aigure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Anti-intrusion techniques. (adapted from [17D
In light of the above taxonomy, most of the current intrusion detection systems
fall exclusively in the category of detection, although some systems have started to
implement automated responses.
92.2 A Generic Diagram for Intrusion Detection Systems
Although intrusion detection systems may vary significantly from each other, in terms
of data sources, feature extraction and classification, etc, they do share common
aspects of functionality and structure among all of them. In order to tell the
differences between normal and malicious activities, an IDS needs to be able to
abstract the user activities to a set of statistical features. It also needs to maintain
a knowledge database of known normal or attack patterns. A generic architectural
model of intrusion detection systems is depicted in Aigure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 A generic diagram of intrusion detection systems.
The input data of an IDS can be from various sources: network traffic, system
and application logs, network management information, etc. The input data are first
processed and reduced into small sets of selected features. A database of reference
models maintains the information about known attack signatures, for misuse systems,
or known normal user patterns, for anomaly systems. The classification engine
determines whether the data received from the data processor actually contains
malicious activities. Alarms will be generated when suspicious activities are detected.
Administrators may also configure the detection parameters and specify the security
policies to control system reactions on different attacks.
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2.3 The State of the Art in Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection, in its essence, is a classification process, in that it tries to identify
small amount of interesting attacks or anomalous patterns out of huge amount of
input raw data. Therefore, the existing pattern classification techniques in other
research domains, such as statistics, neural networks, pattern matching, data mining
and, even, immunology, etc, had been widely borrowed and applied in this area. For
example, the "association rule" , which was originally proposed by Argawal et al. [18]
to find out the frequent item sets in customer transaction data, had been applied
to automatically discover attack detection rules in JAM [5]; The NIDES [12] used
both statistical metrics and expert systems to detect anomalies and misuses; Neural
Networks and Support Vector Machines (SVM), which are commonly used in the
machine learning disciplines, have been used by researchers to detect attacks [19,20].
The rest of this section will briefly introduce the various intrusion detection
techniques found in literature and commercial products.
2.3.1 Statistical Detection
Statistical algorithms have been widely utilized by various intrusion detection systems
to extract the statistical features describing the activity patterns within the input
data, to predict the expected measurements of normal/attack instances, and to
compare the observed feature vectors with the expected patterns. Aor example,
the INBOUND, [11], detects traffic anomalies by measuring the deviations of the
traffic parameters from the averages of the normal users. Gao et al. [21] studied
the application of Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to profile UNIX processes. The
NIDES, [12], represents user or system behaviors by a set of statistical variables
and detects the deviation between the observed and the standard activities. In [22],
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics was used to model and detect Denial-of-Service and
Probing attacks.
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2.3.2 Neural Networks
The neural networks are widely considered as an efficient approach to adaptively
classify patterns. In [7,19], backpropagation (BP) neural networks were used to detect
anomalous user activities. The Self-Organization Maps (SOMs) were applied to detect
host-based attacks in [23]. Sung et al. [20] tested the importance of the prominent
features in intrusion detection by using Support Vector Machines (SVMs). If properly
trained, neural network classifiers can learn the mapping function between the input
and output sample spaces and accurately classify unforeseen input data based on the
learned knowledge. However, the knowledge that neural network classifiers acquired
from training data is difficult to interpret. High computation intensity and long
training cycles also hinder the applications of neural networks in real-time systems.
2.3.3 Pattern Matching Systems
Pattern matching is the most commonly used technique in misuse intrusion
detection systems by searching the specific attack signatures within files or packet
payloads. Example commercial systems include the RealSecure from Internet Security
Systems [24], NAR from NAR Security [25]. Example open source software includes
the detection engine of SNORT [8] and BRO [9]. The advantage of this technique is
that this approach is straightforward and easy to be understood by administrators.
However, developing and testing attack signatures are labor-intensive. It is very
difficult for these systems to keep up with the evolution paces of today's attack
techniques. Moreover, these systems can not detect unforeseen new attacks.
2.3.4 Data Mining Approaches
Due to the difficulties in manually developing the attack signatures and normal
patterns, data mining techniques have been introduced by various researchers to
automatically discover these patterns. Data mining (also known as Knowledge
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Discovery in Databases - KDD) has been defined as "The nontrivial extraction of
implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful information from data" [26].
The commonly used data mining algorithms in intrusion detection systems include
association rules [5], decision trees [27, 28] and clustering [29, 30], etc. These data
mining techniques have drawn growing research interests since they can automatically
discover detailed attack or normal models that can be easily understood by human
beings. However, the drawback is that these data mining systems tend to generate
a large number of models, especially for input data with large size. Extra human
intervention and care must be taken to reduce and refine the extracted models.
2.3.5 Computer Immune Systems
Natural immune systems protect animals from dangerous foreign pathogens, including
bacteria, viruses, parasites, and toxins. The role of the computer security systems
in computers is analogous to that of the natural immune systems in animal bodies.
Inspired by the principles in Immunology, Aorrest and her group [31] applied the
ideas from Immunology into building artificial immune systems for computers. In
their approach, the problem of protecting computer systems from attacks was viewed
as an instance of the more general problem of distinguishing self (legitimate users,
uninfected programs) from others (unauthorized users, viruses and other malicious
codes). Dasgupta et al. [32] presented another immunology-inspired intrusion
detection system by using both positive (non-self) and negative (self) selection
mechanisms of the immune system to detect computer attacks either in positive space
(attack signatures) or in negative space (normal patterns). Although theoretically are
these systems interesting, the actual effectiveness of this immunological approach is
still waiting to be proved.
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2.4 Attack Scenarios and Alert Correlation
An attack scenario is a sequence of attacks that an attacker launches in order
to achieve certain malicious purposes. While some isolated attacks occur without
warning, most network-based intrusions go through certain fairly well-defined stages
to scan and compromise victim hosts. Aor example, the attack scenario resulting a
DDoS attack, Aigure 2.3, contains the following distinctive steps:
Figure 2.3 A sample attack scenario.
I. The attacker site-maps the topology of the victim network through IP sweeping;
2. Port scanning and probing attacks are launched to identify open ports, the
provided services, the operating systems and the possible penetrating points
and methods against the victim hosts;
3. The attacker breaks into the victim machines and gains the root privileges by
exploiting these identified weaknesses;
4. Trojan and "back-door" programs are installed in the compromised systems;
5. These compromised systems are then used as attack agents to launch a
distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attack to another network.
The gradually unfolding characteristic of this attack scenario provides ample
time for an IDS to detect and arrest it in the early stages so that the severe damages
could be prevented. Detecting these different threats and discovering the attack
scenarios at the earliest possible time would provide a lot of important information
for system administrators to take appropriate countermeasures promptly.
Traditional intrusion detection systems are trained to detect as many suspicious
activities as they could find. However, the usefulness of the generated alerts is often
limited by the following two factors:
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1. The positives (alerts) are in general fine-grained, low-level. Each alert
corresponds to an attack fingerprint the IDS detected in a packet or a session.
The arrival of the alerts is bursty and sometimes temporally overlapping. A
high-level situational overview describing the whole attack scenarios is absent.
2. The "effectiveness" of current IDSs is low. "Effectiveness" is defined as the
probability that a positive alert detection by an IDS is actually true. Axeisson
pointed out that base-rate fallacy applies to Intrusion Detection [33]. It means,
even for an IDS with very low false positive rate, the probability that an alarm
indicates a real intrusion is still low, due to the fact that the population of
normal activities is overwhelmingly larger than the population of intrusions.
The base-rate fallacy is one of the most serious problems for current IDSs. Every
alert needs time and human power to investigate. A large number of false positives
can distract the attention of administrators so that the true critical positives could
accidentally be ignored. Aurthermore, the number of false positives might become so
high that administrators could get bored and simply ignore all alerts.
Aor the above reasons, the alert correlation (also called data fusion in some
literature) is drawing more research interests as a solution to the above problems.
The alert correlation correlates alerts of different attacks and heterogeneous ID sensors
together into attack scenarios, which provides coarse-level description about intrusion
plan. These scenarios could help to infer the intruders' intentions and appraise the
security threats. Also, the false positives could be isolated and filtered out based on
their differences in space, time and other aspects.
A number of research projects have been started in the field of alert correlation.
The GrIDS, [34], uses predefined rule sets to combine alerts and network data into
a graph structure to discover large scale coordinated attacks. The EMERALD, [35],
correlates alerts using a probabilistic approach by comparing the similarities among
the alerts. Bain, [36], proposed algorithms to estimate the probability that an alert
belongs to a given scenario, and to fuse the alert with the most possible scenario.
Staniford et al., [37], used simulated annealing to cluster anomalous packets together
into portscan scenarios.
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2.5 Intrusion Detection Evaluation
Intrusion detection is a classification process, which involves the fitting of models
to data, then enabling inferences from these models. Generally, the performance
of a pattern recognition system can be quantified by two measurements: the true
positive rate (TPR, Probability(positiveattack)) and the false positive rate (APR,
Probability(positivenormal)). As stated in Section 1.3.2, in general, it is not possible
to achieve a TPR of 1 and a APR of 0. The common practice in evaluating pattern
recognition algorithms is to choose the one with the best TPR within the constraints
of an acceptable APR.
Unfortunately, evaluating intrusion detection systems by using the above stated
criteria is problematic due to the following reasons.
Problem 1 There is no standard definition of what constitutes conitored security
events.
A typical IDS looks at a series of events and tries to identify those that represent
an intrusion. The input data may be log records from one or more monitored services
on a host, packets on a network, or some other descriptors of activity within the
monitored domain. A security event, the unit of analysis, could be defined as a log
record, a network packet, or a TCP session. This lack of universal acceptance of the
event definitions could lead to big difference in TPR and APR values, thus making
comparison of systems with different event definitions meaningless.
Problem 2 ID perforcance is traffic/attack sensitive.
Intrusion detection systems are trained and tested by data collected from a test
environment containing a limited number of attack instances. An IDS having good
training and testing performance could yield very high APR in another environment
with completely different background settings.
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Moreover, the abundance and the fast evolution on attack tools make it
impossible to train ID systems with all possible attack patterns. Therefore, an
IDS could have high detection rate on some kinds of attacks but perform poorly
on detecting other types of attacks in a real network.
Problem 3 Independent and unbiased data sets are hard to obtain.
The above two stated problems could be alleviated somehow by testing IDSs
with a common data set. Unfortunately independent data sets are hard to obtain,
because 1) network data are hard to be properly identified (one can never be sure
that there are no subtle attacks hiding undiscovered in the data); 2) background and
attack models are not stationary and can not be clearly defined, thus rendering the
usefulness of any static evaluation data short-lived.
2.5.1 DARPA/MIT-LL Intrusion Detection Evaluation Projects
As an effort to reliably evaluate the capabilities of existing intrusion detection systems,
MIT Lincoln Labs (MIT-LL) was designated by DARPA to build a simulation network
at about 1998. The background network traffic was simulated according to the traffic
statistics observed in an Air Aorce base. A mixture of different user profiles and
different attacks were simulated in the network. So far, three data sets (named as
DARPA98, DARPA99 and DARPA2000) have been released and can be publicly
downloaded from their web site [38].
The definitions of security events are slightly different among these three data
sets. In DARPA98, an event is defined as a session, which can be TCP, UDP or ICMP.
A session is characterized by a start time, duration, service, source and destination
(IP address and port). Using the session as the unit of analysis is less than satisfactory
since it does not provide accurate results if
• A single attack requires more than one service to be used or involves multiple
sessions of the same service to be completed or
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• A false alarm determination is based on data from more than one session.
In DARPA98 and DARPA2000, events are defined as attack instances, which
may include multiple sessions. An attack instance is characterized by the attack date,
the attack time and the victim IP address.
2.6 The Framework of EWIDS
An early warning intrusion detection system (EWIDS) is designed to detect three
types of attacks: reconnaissance attacks (P&P), denial of service (DoS) attacks,
and privilege escalation attacks (RWL or UWR). It also correlates the alerts of
reconnaissance attacks into attack scenarios, discovers the coordinated distributed
attacks, and alarms the system administrators at the earliest possible time that
attacks are undergoing. A complete early warning system usually consists of the
following five sub systems (see Aigure 2.4):
Figure 2.4 The system diagram of the EWIDS.
• Known Activity Ailter (KAA): works as the packet filter for the EWIDS. It
bypasses those known normal packets and drops those known attack packets.
The detailed diagram of KAA is given in Subsection 2.6.1.
• DoP Detection System: detects DoP attacks at the earliest possible stage so
that the attack traffic could be blocked from entering the network and significant
service degradations could be avoided. The DoS detection system used in this
EWIDS system is HIDE, which is described in Chapter 3.
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• Reconnaissance Detection System: detects the reconnaissance attacks.
Although reconnaissance attacks do not cause any material damage on the
victim systems, they do provide the useful information about the imminence
of more malicious attacks. By detecting reconnaissance activities in the earliest
possible time, an early-warning system can provide the protection to thwart
potential attack devastating scenarios in their early stages. The algorithms and
results of the proposed RIDS system are presented in Chapter 7.
• Privilege Escalation Detection System: prevents attackers from gaining
unauthorized privileges by exploiting system weaknesses. This subsystem is an
integral part of a complete EWIDS but not within the scope of this dissertation.
• Security console: is the interface between administrators and the early warning
system. It visualizes the attack alerts detected by the system and provides the
administrator the interface to configure and to administer the whole system.
Figure 2.5 Known activity filter.
The KAA module, Aigure 2.5, processes the packets sniffed from the network
and filters out the packets whose source or destination addresses are listed in the back
or white lists. The black list lists the IP addresses of the known attackers. Whenever
KAA detects packets from these attackers, it will immediate report to security console
and then drop the packets. The white list lists the IP addresses of the known normal
users. By filtering out packets of known status, a great portion of computational
powers can be saved to concentrate on analyzing unknown traffic.
CHAPTER 3
HIDE: A HIERARCHICAL INTRUSION DETECTION ENGINE
The HIDE [39] is a statistical anomaly intrusion detection system. It represents
statistical parameters in PDA format, compares the observed parameters with the
reference models using PDA similarity metrics, and classifies the measured similarity
distances using neural network classifiers.
Section 3.1 briefly reviews the existing literature on DoP attack detection.
Section 3.2 introduces the system architecture of HIDE. Section 3.3 describes the
event definition and the monitored statistical features. Section 3.4 presents HIDE's
statistical mode. The detection results are reported in Section 3.5.
3.1 Literature Review in DoS Attack Detection
The DoS attacks pose serious threats on the computer infrastructures of both
commercial and governmental organizations. Any interrupt or downgrade of the
services provided by an organization could cause huge financial loss and impair the
public reputation of the organization. The recent trend of the marriage between
computer viruses and DoS attacks (e.g. the DoS attacks on the web sites of Microsoft
and SCO launched by the machines infected by the Mydoom virus [40]) makes this
threat even more immense.
There are many varieties of DoP attacks. Some DoP attacks (for example
mailbomb, neptune, or smurf attacks) abuse some legitimate features. Some other
attacks (e.g. teardrop, Ping of Death) create malformed packets that target the
TCP/IP protocol stacks of the susceptible machines. Still others (back, syslogd)
exploit the bugs of particular network services and applications.
Most commercial and open source intrusion detection systems, such as
RealSecure [24], SNORT [41] and Bro [9], etc, use both the signatures and the
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frequency counters of events of interest to detect DoS attacks. These techniques
are useful in detecting known DoP attacks using malformed packets and exploiting
specific application bugs, but they have difficult to detect new or old DoP attacks
that abuse legitimate features.
A lot of research activities have been conducted to detect DoS attacks. The
NIDES [12] developed sophisticated statistical algorithms to measure the distributions
of short-term and long-term profiles using a 2-1ike test to measure the similarity
between these two profiles. Lee et al. [5] represented network sessions using 41 various
quantitative and qualitative features and utilized association rules to automatically
discover the attack patterns. They processed a portion of the DARPA'98 data set
using these 41 features and published the resulted data files as the KDD CUP 1999
contest data [42]. Sung [20] evaluated the importance of these 41 features using
both neural network classifiers and support vector machines (SVMs). Giacinto [43]
tested the effectiveness of classifying the KDD CUP 1999 data using multiple neural
classifiers, one classifier for features within a category. Dasgupta [32] used immunity-
based techniques and a nearest-neighbor classifier to detect the network-based attacks
in the DARPA'99 data set.
3.2 The System Architecture of HIDE
The HIDE is a distributed hierarchical application, which in principle consists of
multiple tiers, each tier containing several Intrusion Detection Agents (IDAs). The
IDAs are intrusion detection components that monitor the activities of a host or a
network. The diagram of an IDA is illustrated in Aigure 3.1; it consists of the following
components: probe, event preprocessor, statistical processor, neural network classifier
and post processor. The functionalities of these components are described below:
• Probe: Collects the network traffic of a host or a network, abstracts the traffic
into a set of statistical variables to reflect the network status, and periodically
generates reports to the event preprocessor (see Aigure 3.2).
l..... -4
Figure 3.1 The diagram of intrusion detection agent.
• Event Preprocessor: Receives reports from both the probe and IDAs of lower
tiers, and converts the information into the format required by the statistical
model (as shown in Aigure 3.2).
• Statistical Processor: Maintains the reference models of typical network
activities, compares the reports from the event preprocessor to the reference
models, and forms a stimulus vector to feed into the neural network classifiers.
• Neural Network Classifier: Analyzes the stimulus vector from the statistical
model to decide whether the network traffic is normal or not.
• Post Processor: Generates reports for the agents at higher tiers. At the same
time, it may display the results through a user interface.
3.3 The Monitored Events and Descriptive Statistical Features
The HIDE is a packet-oriented, time-window based intrusion detection system. The
event, or the unit of analysis, of HIDE is defined as "the aggregated statistical pattern
of all network traffic, including both incoming and outgoing packets, observed within
a time window" . At the end of each time window, all monitored statistical features,
which represent the traffic statistics of the current time window, are extracted by
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Figure 3.2 The probe and the event preprocessor.
the "Event Preprocessor" and forwarded to the following stages to detect possible
attacks. The "Neural Network Classifier" will output a continuous value describing
the normality of the current network traffic.
The HIDE is capable of monitoring many different statistical traffic features
simultaneously to accurately describe the network status (a detailed description of all
statistical features is given in Appendix A.1). However, monitoring all these features
is computationally expensive and a subset of these features may already be sufficient
to detect DoS attacks. Therefore, to achieve the maximum flexibility and efficiency,
HIDE is purposefully designed to allow users to customize the statistical feature set
as desired in order to monitor traffic at run-time.
3.4 The PDF Statistical Model
Statistical methods have been used in intrusion detection systems. Most of these
systems simply measure the means and the standard deviations of statistical
parameters and detect whether certain thresholds have been exceeded, like
INBOUND [11]. SRI's NIDES [12] developed a more sophisticated statistical
algorithm by using a 2-1ike test to measure the similarity between short-term and
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long-term profiles. In [22], Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistics was used to model
and detect Denial-of-Service and Probing attacks. The current statistical model of
HIDE uses a modified KS algorithm. Therefore, some basic information about X2
and KS statistics will first be briefly introduced in this chapter.
In HIDE, user activities are represented by a number of probability density
functions. Let S be the sample space of a random variable and events A1 , A2 , . . . , AK
a mutually exclusive partition of S. Assume p i is the expected probability of the
occurrence of the event Ai , and let pi be the frequency of the occurrence of Ai during
a given time interval. Let N denote the total number of occurrences.
The 2-1ike test, Equation 3.1, is used as the statistical engine of NIDES to
determine the similarity between the expected and actual distributions.
When N is large and the events A1 , A2, , AK are independent, Q
approximately follows a X2 distribution with K — 1 degrees of freedom. However, in
a real-time application, the above two assumptions generally can not be guaranteed,
thus, empirically, Q may not follow a X2 distribution.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, given in Equation 3.2, is applicable to measure
the similarity when the underlying distribution is unknown. Assume F(x) is the
expected cumulative probability distribution (CDA); (x) is the measured CDA;
and Fi are the expected and the measured CDAs at event
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The strength of the KS test is that, if F(x) is continuous, the distribution of DN
does not dependent on the underlying distribution of F(x), but only on the number
of samples N.
Because neural networks are used as classifiers to identify possible intrusions
in HIDE, it is not necessary for HIDE to know the actual distribution of DN.
However, since network traffic is not stationary and network-based attacks may
have different time durations, varying from a couple of seconds to several hours or
longer, a robust and efficient algorithm is needed to monitor network traffic with
different time windows. Based on the above observations, a layer-window statistical
model, Aigure 3.3, with each layer-window corresponding to a monitoring time slice
of increasing size, is chosen.
Figure 3.3 The statistical model of HIDE.
The newly arrived events will first be stored in the event buffer of layer 1. The
stored events are compared with the reference model of that layer and the results are
then fed into the neural network classifier to decide the network status during that
time window. The event buffer will be emptied once it becomes full, and the stored
events will be averaged and forwarded to the event buffer of layer 2. This process will
be repeated recursively until the top level is reached where the events will simply be
dropped after processing.
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The similarity-measuring algorithm used in HIDE is given in Equation 3.3.
The right-hand side of the equation is the combination of the KS test and the area
difference between the distributions. Therefore, this equation is called the AKS test.
The function f (N) is a function of the number of samples N.
A reference updating algorithm has also been designed to update the reference
model based on the newly observed real-time traffic. Let Mold be the reference model
before updating, M„,, be the reference model after updating and K be the observed
user activity within a time window. The formula to update the reference model is
given in Equation 3.4.
in which a is a predefined adaptation rate and s is the value generated by the
output of the neural classifier. Assume that the output of the neural network classifier
is a continuous variable c between —1 and 1, where —1 means intrusion with absolute
certainty and 1 means no intrusion again with complete confidence. In between, the
values of indicate proportionate levels of certainty. The function for calculating s is
Through the above equations, it can be ensured that the reference model
would be actively updated for typical traffic while kept unchanged when attacks
occurred. The attack events will be diverted and stored, as attack scripts, for future
investigation.
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3.5 The Detection Results of HIDE
Three different data sets have been used to evaluate the performance of HIDE. The
first data set is generated from OPNET simulations. The second data set is provided
by the DARPA'98 intrusion detection evaluation project. And the third data set is
collected from a testbed network setup within the CONEX laboratory of NJIT. Aor
simplicity, the first data set will be referred as the "OPNET" data set, the second
data set as the "DARPA'98" data set and the third data set as the "TESTBED"
data set, here on.
3.5.1 The OPNET Simulation Data
A virtual network using simulation tools has been used to generate attack scenarios.
The experimental test bed that was built using OPNET, a powerful network
simulation facility, is shown in Aigure 3.4. The test bed is a 10-BaseX LAN that
consists of eleven workstations and one server.
Figure 3.4 OPNET simulation testbed.
In the simulation network, three types of network traffic comprise the simulated
traffic: HTTP, ATP, and SMTP (Email). To generate enough UDP background
traffic, UDP is configured as the transport protocol of the SMTP services. Even
though this configuration is not quite realistic, it does not undermine the general
conclusions got in this experiment.
The UDP flooding attacks were simulated within the testbed. To stress-test the
performance of the system, multiple simulation scenarios with different background
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traffic and attack traffic loads were carried out. Table 3.1 lists the traffic specifications
of the simulated scenarios.
Aor each simulation scenario, ten thousand records of network traffic were
collected. These data were divided into two separate sets, one set of 6000 data for
training and the other of 4000 data for testing.
Figure 3.5 The detection results on the OPNET data.
The classification results of stress testing are shown in Aigure 3.5. Arom the
figure, the reader can see that the misclassification rates decrease as the attack level
increases. This is because the traffic patterns of higher-volume attacks yield greater
differences from the reference model than the differences created by lower-volume
attacks. It can also be noticed that, for a certain attack level, the performance for the
28
600Kbps background traffic is consistently better than that of the 2Mbps background.
One plausible explanation is that intruders can more easily cover their behavior
patterns from being detected in high background traffic environments. Please refer
to the paper [44] for more stress testing results.
Overall, the results indicate that HIDE can effectively detect UDP flooding
attacks with traffic intensity as low as five to ten percent of the background intensity.
Figure 3.6 The DARPA IDEVAL network (adapted from [38]).
This data set was generated by the MIT Lincoln labs in 1998 as the intrusion
detection offline evaluation project sponsored by DARPA [38]. These data were
collected in an isolated controlled network environment (see Aigure 3.6), which
consists of two segments: the "inside" network simulates the network of an Air
force base; and the "outside" network simulates the Internet. These two segments
are interconnected by a router, and a sniffer is used to capture the packets passing
through the router. The DARPA'98 data set includes seven weeks of training data
and two weeks of testing data and contains the following attack types:
• Surveillance and Probing (PlS) Attacks: are used to gather information about
the victim network topology, the network services, and the potential penetrating
points.
• Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: are attacks aiming at bringing down a server
or a network so that normal users would not be able to access the services.
• Remote to Local (RWL) Attacks: are attacks aiming to gain unauthorized access
to a local server from a remote machine.
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• User to Root ( UWR) Attacks: are used by a local unprivileged user to gain
unauthorized access to local super-user privileges.
Only the network-based DoS attacks with observable disturbance on the
network traffic are considered in the experiment. The rest attack packets are simply
filtered out before entering HIDE. The DoP attacks considered include:
neptune is a PYN flooding denial-of-service attacks on one or more TCP ports to
overflow TCP connection buffer through creating a large number of half-open
TCP connections.
pod (or Ping of Death) is a Denial-of-Service attack to crash victim servers by
sending large amount of over-sized IP packets.
Smurf is a DoP attack to flood the victim server by creating a large, continuous
stream of ICMP "ECHO" replies.
Teardrop is a DoS attack that exploits the flaws of IP defragmentation programs
of many older operating systems.
The detection results of HIDE are tabulated in Table 3.2. In total, 59226
useful data samples were collected. Among them, 1074 samples are attacks while the
remaining 58152 samples are normal. Therefore, the base-line misclassification rate
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for this DARPA'98 data set is 1074/59226 = 0.0181; the latter indicates a dummy
IDS that could achieve a 98.2% detection rate by simply classifying all of the attacks
as normal. Table 3.2 showed that HIDE performed more than 30 times better than
the base-line rate.
The detection performance of HIDE on different DoP attacks is described in
Table 3.3. Arom the table, it can be seen that HIDE had very low false negative rates
on all the four monitored DoS attacks.
Figure 3.7 The topology of the CONEX TESTBED network.
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The CONEX TESTBED network, see Aigure 3.7, is a testbed network setup in
the CONEX lab of NJIT as a platform to emulate network-based attacks in order to
test the performance of intrusion detection prototypes. The network includes three
subnets: victic subnet, background subnet and the attack subnet. A more detailed
description about the network topology, the attack emulations and the related tools
can be found in Appendix B.
Three days worth of TCPDUMP data were collected from the CONEX
TESTBED network. The detection results in testing HIDE are listed in Table 3.4.
Here the base-line misclassification rate is 568/7582 = 0.0749. As shown in the table,
the misclassification rate of HIDE is about 25 times lower than the base-line error
rate.
The detection performance of HIDE on detecting the five different DoP attacks
is listed in Table 3.5. Arom the table the reader can see that, except for the four false
negatives of the "teardrop" attacks, HIDE had perfect detection results on the other
four kinds of attacks.
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3.5.4 EDisting DARPA Results of Other IDSs
Because the DARPA98 data sets are publicly accessible and have been widely used
in various intrusion detection literatures, a natural question that may rise is how
the performance of HIDE compares with other state-of-the-art intrusion detection
systems.
Unfortunately, a fair comparison is difficult because the definitions of events are
different between HIDE and MIT-LL evaluation projects: as stated in Section 3.2,
time windows are defined as the basic units of analysis in HIDE, whereas the DARPA
MIT-LL projects used "sessions" or "attack instances" as the basic events (see
Section 2.5.1).
Some of the existing results when using DARPA MIT-LL data sets are briefly
listed below:
1. The best DoG detection result in the DARPA'98 IDEVAL project can detect
around "65% of all DoP attacks, but with very few false alarms" [45]. The
DARPA'98 IDEVAL project used "session" as the unit of events.
2. The best DoG detection results in DARPA'99 IDEVAL project can detect about
85% of all "clear" DoG attacks with 10 false alarms per day (see Aigure 3 of [46]).
The DARPA'99 IDEVAL project used "attack instance" as the unit of events.
3. Sung [20] reported a 99.25% detection rate on DoP attacks by using support
vector machines. "Session" is used as the basic unit in [20].
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4. Dasgupta [32] detected around 96.2 percent of the selected clear P&G and DoG
attacks in the DARPA'99 data set. In [32], time windows with 1-minute window
size are used as basic events.
Among the listed results, Dasgupta [32] has similar definition of events as HIDE.
The "99.4%" detection rate of HIDE on the DARPA'98 data set (see Section 3.5.2)
is higher than that reported in [32].
The other results mentioned earlier in this section are not directly comparable
with HIDE. They are listed to illustrate the performance level of the current state of
the art in DoG detections.
CHAPTER 4
IDENTIFYING IMPORTANT HIDE FEATURES
4.1 Introduction
Detecting intrusions involves the multi-variate classifications based on the monitored
features. Generally, intrusion detection systems are designed to use as many features
as the designers could think they might be useful. Aor example, JAM [5], an
intrusion detection system prototyped by Columbia University, monitors 41 different
parameters for each session; HIDE (see Chapter 3) monitors 45 traffic measurements
observed within a time window. The experimental results on these systems had proved
that all these selected features could be used to accurately detect attack activities.
Three questions may naturally arise for these multi-variate classification
approaches:
1. Are all these features equally useful?
2. If not all features are equally important, which features are more important?
3. Is it possible to remove some of the features without performance deterioration?
The issue of the Aeature Subset Selection (ASS) has been widely studied in the
various fields, such as Machine Learning [47], Pattern Recognition [48], Statistic [49]
and Data Mining [50], etc. Generally, the researches in those areas address the ASS
problems via two major models:
1. Filter Model [51] ranks and selects the features by measuring the statistical
properties and the discrimination power of the feature subset. The commonly
used filtering methods are the correlation criterion, the single feature
classification, the information theoretic ranking and the Aisher criterion score.
The "correlation criterion" [52] ranks the features based on the absolute
values of the correlation coefficients between the features and the target;
the "information theoretic ranking" method [53] selects features according to
the mutual information between each variable and the target; the "Aisher
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criterion'', [52], scores features by calculating the statistical difference of
an individual feature in positive and negative classes; the "single feature
classification" [54] selects features according to the predictive power of the
individual features.
2. Wrapper Model [51] searches the feature subset by using the learning
algorithm of interest as a black box to score subsets of features based on
their classification performance. Liu et al. [50] surveyed the commonly feature
searching strategies in the wrapper model: cocplete search, heuristic search
and no-detercinistic search.
The cocplete search strategy evaluates all possible combinations of the feature
set. This strategy guarantees to find the optimal feature subset, but quickly
becomes computationally impractical when the number of features grows large;
the heuristic search strategy avoids the needs of cocplete search by employing
heuristics in conducting search. This method is more computationally efficient
than the complete search, but it could result sub-optimal feature subset if it's
stuck in the local maxima; the no-detercinistic search strategy tries to escape
from local maxima by introducing randomness into the searching process.
The filter model is faster and can be used as a generic method for feature
selection, without relying on a specific learning method. On the other hand, the
wrapper model is slower but it's capable of finding an optimal or suboptimal feature
subset for a given learning method.
The objective of this chapter is to identify important HIDE features, not
necessary to be optimal, and to evaluate the performance of HIDE using different
feature subsets. Therefore, three different feature subsets are constructed using the
filtering methods:
1. Pingle feature classification on all attacks. This method evaluates the
classification performance of individual features on all attacks that HIDE
detects. These results are then compared with the base-line classification rates
(please refer to Section 3.5.2 for the definition of base-line classification rates).
The features, which perform better than the base-line rate, are regarded as
important/relevant features and selected into the first feature subset.
2. Pingle feature classification on individual attacks. This method evaluates
the classification performance of individual features when classifying different
, where Dun and an are the mean and the variance of feature r in the negative
class; pp and op are the mean and the variance of feature r in the positive class
36
attacks, one attack at a time. The relevant features (features that perform
better than the base-line rates) are selected into the second feature subset.
3. Feature selection using decision tree. This method utilizes a decision tree, which
is capable of automatically selecting the features based on the information gain
ratio [53]. The features selected by the decision tree are used as the third feature
subset.
Three neural network classifiers will be trained using the three above-selected
feature subsets. The classification performance will be compared with the HIDE
performance, when using the full feature set (see Section 3.5).
4.1.1 Related Work in Intrusion Detection
Although all intrusion detect systems involve multi-feature classifications, surprisingly
few papers have been published to systematically study the ASS problems in intrusion
detection systems. Lee et al. [5] proposed an automated process to discover important
features using association rules and frequent episode. Sung et al. [20] ranked the 41
features provided in the KDD Cup 99 data set [42] using support vector machines
(SVMs) and neural networks.
4.2 Objective Functions
The objective function is a cost measurement function to evaluate the goodness
of a particular feature subset. The commonly used objective functions in the
classification problems are the measurements of the classification/prediction accuracy,
such as mean-square root error, misclassification rate, false positive rate and false
negative rate. Sometime, the number of features (to be minimized) is also used as a
regularization term in the functions.
In this chapter, six different objective functions are devised to study their
impacts on the ASS process. The first objective function, see Equation 4.1, measures
the misclassification rate of a feature subset.
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Where s is a given feature set; N is total number of samples; Nofn(s) is the
number of false positive outputs of a classifier using the feature subset s; Nofn (s) is
the number of false negative outputs of a classifier using the feature subset s.
The second objective function, see Equation 4.2, takes the size of the feature
subset, Is', into consideration as a cost factor.
In the equation, the second RHS term measures the related computation cost
of the feature subset s, which is a product of Jibs) and logo, Is' to avoid those trivial
feature subsets with high misclassification rates and small numbers of features.
a is a scaling constant determined by the maximum computation cost, which
is specified by users. Aor example, if max Is! is the size of the full feature set, and if
the maximum computation cost is set to c, a can be calculated using Equation 4.3.
Figure 4.1 The computation cost at different a's.
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Several curves of Is' and logic, Is! at different c's and a's are plotted in Aigure 4.1
to illustrate the impact of a's on the computed costs. In this chapter, the maximum
computation cost c is set to 0.25, therefore, a is set to maxlsI 4 accordingly.
To compare the impact of different computation cost functions, another
objective function is devised to include the computation cost as a square-rooted factor,
see Equation 4.4.
In the equation, /3 is a constant to modulate the computation cost. It is set to
0.25 in this chapter to conform with the maximum computation cost c, which is set
to 0.25.
Because the false positives have larger impact on the performance of an IDS,
three other objective functions are designed as an effort to reduce the false positives,
see Equation 5 to Equation 7.
In the equations, y is an adjustable constant to emphasize the importance of
reducing false positives. In this chapter, 7 is set to 0.6.
The feature subsets that lead to lower values of the six objective functions are
desirable.
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4.3 Classification using Single Feature
The performance of individual features can be measured as the lowest misclassification
rate in the ROC curves, which are defined as the graphs between the true positive
rates bTPRs) and the false positive rates bAPRs) at different detection thresholds [55].
The relationship between the misclassification rate, error, and the TPR and the APR
is given in Equation 4.8.
Where N is the total number of samples; Nt is the number of attack samples;
Mtn  is the number of normal samples; Nofn is the number of false negatives; and
Nofp  is the number of false positives.
The minimum misclassification rate of a feature can be calculated by examining
all possible thresholds from the training data. It might seem to be computationally
expensive to examine all possible thresholds, but, for a given training data with m,
records, there are maximally c-1 possible different thresholds. Once the training
data has been sorted, the searching process can be carried out in one pass.
4.4 EDperimental Results
The data files used in this chapter are the similarity distance files generated by
HIDE, which monitors the 45 traffic features in the DARPA'98 data set bplease
refer to Appendix A for the detailed description of these 45 features). As listed
in Section 3.5.2, there are totally 59226 records, including 1074 attack records and
58152 normal records, in the data files.
A heuristic backward search strategy is deployed in this experiment, in that it
starts with the full 45 features and, after examining the performance of individual
features, removes those irrelevant features.
4.4.1 Feature Filtering Based on All Attacks
Table 4.1 The Aeature Ranking Table of All Attacks
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The classification performance of these features to detect all the four kinds of
attacks is evaluated and listed in Table 4.1, in which the "Error" corresponds to the
misclassification rates of individual features.
Arom Table 4.1, it can be seen that only 25 features are relevant in DoS attack
detection, the other 20 features, ranked from 26 to 45, have the same misclassification
rate 0.0181, which is the base-line misclassification rate of the DARPA'98 data files.
Therefore, only the first 25 useful features are selected in the feature subset. Aor
simplicity, this feature subset is called Set 25 from now on.
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Another feature set, which includes only the best-performed feature "in.tcp-
con-new-opened", is selected to illustrate the performance of the best variable. This
set will be noted as Setl in this chapter.
4.4.2 Feature Filtering Based on Individual Attacks
This experiment examines the performance of the 45 features on individual attacks,
one attack at a time.
Neptune Attack
The classification performance of individual features on neptune attacks is
ranked and listed in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 The Aeature Ranking Table of the neptune Attack
Because there are 798 neptune attack samples within the DARPA'98 data set,
the base-line misclassification rate is 798/59226 = 0.0135. Arom Table 4.2, it can
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be seen that only 16 features, out of the full 45 features, have misclassification rates
lower than the baseline rate.
Moreover, because the misclassification rates of the last two relevant features in
the table, in.udp-diff-src and out.udp-diff-dst, are very close to the baseline rate, and
because these parameters are monitoring the UDP trafflc, which intuitively should
not be closely correlated to TCP trafflc, these two parameters are also not selected.
The 14 selected features are highlighted in bold fonts in Table 4.2.
Smurf Attack
The classification performance of HIDE features on smurf detection is listed
in Table 4.3. Because there are 267 smurf attack samples in DARPA'98 data, the
baseline rate is 267/59226 = 0.00451.
Table 4.3 The Aeature Ranking Table of the scurf Attack
Arom Table 4.3, it can be seen that only six parameters have misclassification
rates lower than the baseline rate. Therefore, these six parameters will be selected in
the new feature subset.
Pod and Teardrop Attacks
Because the pod and teardrop have similar traffic patterns, these two attacks will
be grouped and analyzed together in this experiment. The classification performance
of the 45 features on these two attacks is listed in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4 The Aeature Ranking Table of the pod Attack
Because there are 24 pod attack samples and 12 teardrop attack samples in
DARPA'98 data, the base-line rate of pod and teardrop attacks is 36/59226 =
0.000608. Table 4.4 indicates that there are only two features, "in.ip-frag-rate" and
"in.ip-defrag-error-rate", which are relevant to detect pod and teardrop attacks.
The Selected Feature Subset
Based on the above feature ranking tables, a feature subset of twenty-two
features is selected and listed in Table 5. This feature subset will be noted as Set 22
from now on, for simplicity.
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4.4.3 The Feature Subset of Decision Tree
A decision tree [56] was induced using the DARPA'98 data. Only 8 features were
selected by the induced tree bsee Table 4.6). It can be seen from the table that the
features selected by the decision tree is quite different from the features listed in
Table 4.5. Aor simplicity, this feature subset will be referred to as Set8 in the rest of
this chapter.
4.4.4 Comparing Different Feature Subsets
Neural networks are trained using the feature subsets selected in the above
experiments. The misclassification rates of these neural networks, after being trained
after 2000 epochs, are tabulated in Table 4.7, together with the values of the six
objective functions, which are defined in Section 4.2.
45
In the table, the "Seto" corresponds to the HIDE performance when using
all 45 features bsee Section 3.5.2). The results show that "Set 8" has the lowest
misclassification rates and the minimum values in objective functions among the four
sets. This proves that the classification accuracy and the computation effectiveness
of HIDE can be significantly improved by selecting a proper feature subset.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter constructed three different feature subsets using different feature
filtering methods and evaluated the corresponding classification performance. The
experimental results on DARPA'98 data set indicated that both the classification
accuracy and the system effectiveness can be significantly improved by selecting a
proper feature subset.
Amongst the four feature subsets, the Set 8 has the best performance, which
includes eight features: in. ip-frag-rate, in. tcp-con-new-opened, in. tcp-con-new-closed,
in. tcp-new-aborted, in. tcp-con-diff-src, in.iccp-byt-rate, out. tcp-pkt-len and out.
tcp-pkt-len.
By using the eight features in Set 8 , HIDE can effectively reduce the values of
the four objective functions by almost a half. This proves the importance for an IDS
to properly select the feature set it monitors to maximize the classification accuracy
and to minimize the computation cost.
However, please note that this feature set may not be the optimum feature set,
in terms of the misclassification rate and the number of features, for HIDE to detect
DoS attacks. As reported by John [57], the process of feature subset selection should
depend not only on the features and the objective functions, but also on the learning
algorithm. In the future, an experiment using wrapper searching methods might be
carried out to search the optimum feature subset for backpropagation networks.
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Moreover, it needs to be kept in mind that the whole feature identification
process is data driven, in that the selected feature subsets are highly dependent on
the training data. Therefore, special care is needed to avoid over-fitting the feature
subset for a specific training data.
Given the constant fluctuation and evolution of both background and attack
traffic in Internet, the real objective of feature selection is not to find a feature subset,
which may be optimal for a specific data set but generalize poorly on other data files,
but to select a feature subset that is capable of operating at optimal or near-optimal
conditions over a broad range of network settings. Therefore, the next step for this
research is to apply this feature selection process to data collected from various sources
to further understand the correlations between HIDE features and DoS attacks and
to extensively verify the selected feature subsets.
CHAPTER 5
OPTIMIZING HIDE
The results in Section 3.5 indicated that HIDE can effectively detect DoG attacks
using PDA statistics and neural classifiers with very high accuracy. This section
reports a series of research efforts to optimize the performance of HIDE.
The study of various PDA partitioning algorithms is reported in Section 5.1.
Section 5.2 explores the feasibility of reducing the computation and storage
complexity of HIDE using Wavelet compression. Section 5.3 compares the
performance of different similarity metrics. Section 5.4 tests the classification
performance of different neural networks.
5.1 The Study of PDF Partitioning Algorithms
Representing network measurements into PDA formats involves partitioning the
sample spaces of the measurements into a set of complete and non-overlapping bins
and calculating the frequencies of the observed events that fall within the bins.
Traditional PDA algorithms, e.g. NIDES, built PDA histograms using equally sized
bins, while the total number of bins utilized is determined by expediency. Aor
example, NIDES used 32 bins, chosen to be large enough so details will not be
lost at the cost of additional computational complexity. However, the choice of the
partitioning structure may have significant consequences in the accuracy and the
effectiveness of the numerical representation of a monitored parameter. Yet, little
systematic investigation seems to have been undertaken on this issue. Here three
different partitioning schemes, uniform, logarithmic and percentile, have been tested
in [58].
47
48
Uniform Partitioning Scheme
The uniforc partitioning algorithm divides the sample space into bins of equal
parameter width. Assume x 0 , x1 , . . . , xi is a partition of the sample space with x0 the
minimum and xi the maximum, where N is the total number of bins. The partition
can be calculated using Equation 5.1.
Logarithmic Partitioning Scheme
In the logarithcic partitioning scheme, the sample space is segmented using
Equation 5.2.
Percentile Partitioning Scheme
Assume that Fbx) is the cumulative distribution function bCDA) of a PDA. The
percentile partitioning algorithm generates bins so that all bins have equal probability
value bor mass) following Equation 5.3.
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Sample PDAs using these three partitioning schemes are illustrated in
Aigure 5.1. It can be seen that the log partition has small widths at the lower end and
large widths at the higher end. The percentile partition uses small bins to represent
the middle part of the distribution but uses very large bins to represent the two tails.
The uniforc partition gives equal emphasis to all bins.
Figure 5.1 Sample PDA figures with different partitioning algorithms.
The misclassification rates of 8-bin and 16-bin PDA representations as functions
of attack level are plotted in Aigure 5.2. Arom the figure, the readers can see that, as
the attack level increases, the misclassification probabilities of the systems decrease,
as might be reasonably expected. When the attack levels are low bsay 40 kbps), it
is difficult for the PDA schemes with fewer bins be.g. 4 bins) to detect the attacks,
while the PDAs with more bins be.g. 16 bins) still result in low misclassification rates.
This supports the theory that using PDAs to represent system variables improves the
classification accuracy since they abstract more detailed information that might be
useful for intrusion detection systems.
As the total numbers of bins increase, the behaviors of the three partitioning
algorithms become more similar. At 64, they all perform about the same. This can be
explained by observing that the differences between the real PDAs of the monitored
parameters and their histogram representations decrease as more bins are used to
represent them. As the total numbers of bins changes from 4 bins to 64 bins, in
all sub-figures, the misclassification rates at first decrease, denoting improvement,
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however, when the total number of bins rises beyond 16, the curves become almost
flat, denoting no further performance improvement. This observation suggests that
PDA representations with 16 bins could be the optimum choice for the trade off
between processing complexity and system performance. Please refer to [58] for more
detailed results.
5.2 Compressing PDFs Using Wavelet Compression
Building and handling PDAs consumes much in system processing power, memory
and storage resources. Therefore, an effective data compression algorithm has the
potential to significantly enhance the system efficiency. This section reports the
experiments on compressing PDA data using Wavelet compression.
Among the many wavelet families that exist, [65-68], a wavelet is selected
from each of the following families: the classical Haar basis bcalled haar afterward),
the Symlets basis bcalled sycW afterward), Coiflets bcalled coif3 afterward), and
Daubechies bcalled db4 afterward) wavelets. Samples of compressed PDAs using one
of these four wavelet compression algorithms are plotted in Aigure 5.3.
Figure 5.3 The sample figure of a PDA with different wavelet compressions.
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Experiments with various wavelet compression ranges bsee Table 5.1 have been
carried out and reported in [69]. In the table, PDAs at compression range 1 correspond
to uncompressed PDAs. Note that the wavelets coif8 and db4 require the largest
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number of coefficients at each range, while the wavelets Naar and syc2 provide the
greatest amount of compression.
The above-mentioned wavelet algorithms were used to compress the PDA data
files collected from the OPNET simulations bsee Section 3.5.1), in which the PDAs
are represented using unfiorc partitioning algorithm, see Section 5.1, with 64 bins
into sets of wavelet coefficient. To compare the system performances under various
wavelet compression ranges, the compressed PDAs were reconstructed from the
wavelet coefficients found and then processed by the statistical modules and the neural
network classifier.
Figure 5.4 The misclassification rates of HIDE at different wavelet compression
ranges.
The misclassification rates of HIDE, when trained using these reconstructed
PDAs, are plotted in Aigure 5.4, in which the x-axis represents the five compression
ranges and the y-axis represents the misclassification rates. It can be seen from
the figure that the curve of wavelet compression algorithm sym2 rises slowly, and,
even for compression range 5, the algorithm still shows strong performance with
misclassification rate about 2%. Aor the other three wavelet bases, the system
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performance is satisfactorily for ranges 1 to 3, but then deteriorates for ranges 4
and 5.
The experimental results indicated that the wavelet compression algorithm sycW
is a more appropriate choice for PDA compression. In practice, it was found that sycW
wavelet compression with compression range of 3 b18 wavelet coefficients) is a safe
choice for HIDE to maintain a satisfying performance while boosting system resource
efficiency by almost four fold.
5.3 The Effectiveness of Similarity Metrics
This section investigates the effectiveness of different similarity metrics in intrusion
detection. The four metrics studied are: x 2 test bsee Equation 3.1); KS test bsee
Equation 3.2); AKS test bsee Equation 3.3); and a simplified single-number statistic
bso called SG test, see Equation 5.4). The SG test is used to simulate intrusion
detection using traditional rate-based single-number parameters.
where r is the average value of the monitored parameter within a time window;
pbr) is the probability of r in the reference distribution; and Amax is the maximum
probability of the reference distribution.
The classification performance of these four metrics, when detecting the OPNET
data set, is depicted in Aigure 5.5. The SG metric performs the worst, especially when
attack intensities range from low to medium. This indicates that, by using the PDA
statistics, IDSs can potentially improve the detection rate of early detection of DoG
attacks.
The AKS metric has slightly better performance than the KS statistic. The
X2 test has the lowest misclassification rates when the attack intensity is low. The
Figure 5.5 The misclassification rates of different similarity metrics.
plausible explanation for this observation is that, because the underlying driving
distributions of the OPNET simulations are "Poison" and "Exponential" , which are
memoryless and individually independent, the resulted x 2 distances closely follow
their theoretical distributions. Therefore, the x2 test can accurately tell the difference
between normal and attack PDAs. However, in real network environments, where the
traffic distributions are often bursty and self-similar [59], the above "Poisson" and
"Exponential" assumptions are no longer valid. Due to the inherent distribution
sensitiveness, x2 test may not be a good choice for real network detection. Therefore,
the AKS test is chosen as the similarity metric for most of this work.
5.4 The Study of Neural Network Classifiers
Neural networks are widely considered as an efficient approach to adaptively classify
patterns, but high computation intensity and long training cycles have hindered
their applications in real-time systems. In [7, 19], BP neural networks were used
to detect anomalous user activities. In [39], a hybrid neural network paradigm, called
perceptron-backpropagation-hybrid bor PBH) network [60], which is a superposition of
a perceptron and a small backpropagation network, was deployed to detect intrusions.
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As the core of decision making modules of many anomaly IDSs, classification
techniques have profound impact on system performance and efficiency, but little
research has been carried out to compare the effectiveness of different neural network
classifiers as applied to ID problems. In order to comprehensively investigate the
performance of neural networks, five different types of neural networks are examined
in this section: Perceptron, BP, PBH, Auzzy ART MAP and RBA.
Figure 5.6 The models of neural classifiers tested.
The perceptron [61], Aigure 5.6ba), is the simplest form of a neural network used
for the classification of linearly separable patterns. It consists of a single neuron with
adjustable synapses and threshold. Although the data sets will not, in general, be
linearly separable, the perceptron was used as a baseline to measure the performance
of other neural networks.
The Backpropagation network [61], Aigure 5.6bb), or BP, is a multi-layer
feed-forward network, which contains an input layer, one or more hidden layers,
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and an output layer. BPs have strong generalization capabilities and have been
applied successfully to solve some difficult and diverse problems. The classification
performance of BP networks, with the number of hidden neurons ranging from 2 to
8, was tested.
Perceptron-backpropagation hybrid network [60], or PBH, Aigure 5.6bc), is a
superposition of a perceptron and a small backpropagation network. PBH networks
are capable of exploring both linear and nonlinear correlations between the input
stimulus vectors and the output values. The classification performance of PBH
networks, with the number of hidden neurons ranging from 1 to 8, was tested.
The Auzzy ARTMAP, [62], in its most general form is a system of two Auzzy
ART networks ARTa and ARTb whose A2 layers are connected by a subsystem
referred to as a "match tracking system" . A simplified version of Auzzy ARTMAP [63],
Aigure 5.6bd), which is implemented for classification problems, was used in this
experiment. The ARTMAP networks, with the number of category neurons ranging
from 2 to 8, was tested.
Radial-basis function network [61], or RBA, Aigure 5.6be), involves three entirely
different layers. The input layer is made up of source nodes. The second layer is a
hidden layer of high enough dimension, which serves a different purpose from that in a
BP network. The output layer supplies the response of the network to the activation
patterns applied to the input layer. The RBA networks, with hidden neurons ranging
from 2 to 8, was tested.
The misclassification rates of BP and PBH neural networks are plotted in
Aigure 5.7. The detailed results of all these four classifiers can be found in the
paper [64]. Due to the space limitations, they are not included in this section.
The conclusion in [64] was that BP and PBH networks had similar detection
performance, and that the both neural networks consistently performed better than
the other three types. The misclassification rates of these two networks do not
Figure 5.7 The results of BP and PBH classifiers.
decrease as the number of hidden neurons increases. The explanation could be
that the sample spaces of attack and normal patterns are clearly divided after being
processed using PDA statistics. They are not challenging enough for BP and PBH.
Therefore, the BP network is chosen as the HIDE'S classifier in most of this work.
CHAPTER 6
METHODS OF CLASSIFIER TRAINING IN A PRODUCTION
NETWORK USING TEST NETWORK INFORMATION
6.1 The Challenge in Training Classifiers for a Production Network
In a production network, during its intended operation, an anomaly intrusion
detection system is expected to find anomalous activities. As shown in Aigure 2.2, the
pattern classifier processes the current activity pattern and rates it with a similarity
score as to whether it is more similar to normal or anomalous activity. Similar to
most other learning techniques using supervised training, the HIDE classifier, which
is a back-propagation neural network, needs to be trained with data records of the
typical bnormal) and attack-labeled banomalous) variety in sufficiently large amounts.
Moreover, if one desires to distinguish between different classes of attacks or perhaps
individual attacks, data for all such different attacks need to be made available for
training. Such data will enable the neural net classifier to learn the difference between
normal and anomalous activities, thus achieving high detection and low false alarm
rates. In a test or laboratory network, the researchers and developers can investigate
and record the launching of all desired known attacks, selecting from a library of
attacks, with accurate labels. Such investigations of attacks can be carried out and
recorded for various background traffic types and levels.
The challenge that HIDE faces is that, while both normal and attack data are
easily and conveniently available for a test network, only normal data are routinely
available for a production network. Hence, the classifier of the IDS will probably
be ill-trained for the new network environment and thus unsuitable for use without
changes if b1) the new network is sufficiently different from the test network, so the
new background will not be close to that of the test network, or b2) the IDS lacks
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training that includes attack data for the new network. One or the other, or more
likely both conditions hold in most realistic cases of installations of a new intrusion
detection system and thus the IDS classifier will need to be re-trained at some stage
during or soon after installation.
An anomaly intrusion detection tool that is to be installed in a new real
network environment can reasonably expect some initialization period that will
provide sufficient estimates of the normal behavior of the network. In a typical setting,
by far most of the traffic that the IDS sees is normal with only a sprinkling of attack
traffic. Thus, algorithms could conceivably be used to separate out the normal traffic
from any attacks, whenever they might occur in the new network, based on intensity
comparison considerations alone. Such algorithms, employing clustering techniques,
have been investigated elsewhere [29].
Additionally, it may be that, during the initialization phase, all the traffic in
the new setting is in fact normal. Even if some attack traffic could be found in the
new network, it may be difficult, at this stage, to characterize what type of attack it
is. Therefore only normal traffic models in the new network setting can be observed,
but no clear description of network attacks can be expected. Although theoretically
possible, it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to launch attacks in the network
to be protected, solely for the benefit of the learning phase of the IDS. Most likely it
would not be permitted to take place. Thus, somehow, while using the normal and
attack data from a test network as well as the normal data from the new network, it
needs to be ensured that the classifier is properly and correctly trained.
Two alternative solution approaches to this challenge, the re-use classifier and
the grafted classifier, were proposed in [70]:
• The re-use classifier method is straightforward and consists of employing the
test-network classifier in the new network, as is after being trained only in
the test network, which is without any modifications at the beginning. This
approach is expected to perform adequately well if the new network is similar
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in architecture and usage to the test network, but will likely increasingly
deteriorate in performance the more dissimilar the two settings are.
• The grafted classifier method essentially consists of abstracting a database of
attacks, in their "pure" forms, from the test network and then "grafting"
these attacks onto the normal traffic in the new network, thus "transplanting"
the attack models from the test network to the production network.
In this way, the grafted classifier method will provide adequate attack samples
as well as normal samples in the new network setting, thus enabling the training of
the classifier in the new network. Experiments have been performed to investigate
the effectiveness of these two techniques in an experimental setting, where both have
been found to be effective. The grafted classifier approach will work adequately for
the class of parameters where the effect of the attacks is of "additive" character to
that of the background, which is the case for the DoG attacks that HIDE is designed
to detect.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the expectation regarding these techniques
is not that they generate the final best codel of an attack, but that they will provide a
good "seed" of such a codel, allowing the system to adapt the model by "learning"
from then on, thus bootstrapping onto an accurate attack model from an initially
only adequate estimate. The HIDE employs an adapting algorithm that adjusts the
normal as well as the attack models, by using the descriptions of the current normal
and attack data, after they are detected to be so.
The grafted classifier approach described above may, in general, depend on the
nature of the monitored parameter as well as the type of attack. Basically, it relies
on the assumption that the normal background models vary most from network to
network while the attack models vary least. This assumption is intuitively reasonable
and has been observed to be the case for many types of networks and attacks. The
normal background network traffic changes in time and from network to network. On
the other hand, the behavioral profiles of various kinds of attacks are comparatively
stationary and exhibit similarities from network to network.
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In more detail, this approach involves extracting attack profiles, for each
monitored parameter, from a test network and then applying them to a new
production network. Airstly, the samples of attacks and background traffic are
extracted from the data collected in a test network. Secondly, the attack instances
are calculated by removing the components of normal traffic from the attack models.
Thirdly, the attack samples for the new network can be simulated by combining and
merging the normal samples of the production network with the attack instances that
have been extracted from the test network. Ainally, the IDS classifier can be trained
using the attack data simulated in the previous step together with the normal data
samples.
The definitions of attack sacples, norcal sacples, attack instances and attack
profile, for each parameter, are provided as below:
• Attack Hybrid is the observed traffic pattern, which is represented in PDA
format, with both normal and attack traffic.
• Norcal Pacple is the observed traffic pattern with normal traffic only.
• Attack Abstract is the instance of attack traffic, in its "pure" form, by removing
the normal traffic components from attack samples.
• Attack Profile is an aggregated database of all attack instances.
6.2 Attack Modeling and Simulation
The models of normal network traffic are generally bursty and vary considerably in a
network from time to time and from network to network, therefore it is hard to predict
or estimate the models of normal traffic in advance. However, because the schemes
and patterns of particular attacks often have their own specific characteristics, their
effects on the normal traffic may be fairly consistent. Thus, it may be feasible to
estimate attack models based on the knowledge collected from a test network, at
least well enough to serve as seeds in the new network setting. The flow diagram
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of the attack modeling and simulation is shown in Aigure 6.1, which involves the
following steps:
Figure 6.1 The phases of attack estimation.
1. Hybrid Traffic Sampling in the Test Network: measures the network
traffic, including both normal and attack packets, of the test network, into
PDA data samples.
2. Attack Packet Filter: blocks the attack packets so that only normal packets
can pass through this block.
3. Normal Traffic Sampling in the Test Network: measures the network
traffic, including normal packets only bthe attack packets are filtered out by the
"Attack Packet Ailter"), of the test network, into PDA data samples.
4. Attack Abstract EDtraction: extracts the attack instances by removing the
normal traffic components from the attack samples.
5. Attack Record: is the database of all attack abstract instances extracted from
the previous step.
6. Normal Traffic Sampling in the Target Network: measures the normal
traffic patterns in the target network.
7. Attack Transplant Sample Grafting: at this stage both the attack abstract
instances, which are collected from the test network, and the normal samples,
which are collected from the target network, have all become available. However,
the real objective of these data is to simulate enough attack samples to be used
as training, test and validation data. Explicitly, this algorithm needs to be
able to randomly generate the presumed attack samples that are PDAs that
statistically predict the traffic patterns, should the same attack be observed in
the target network. Subsequently, these simulated attack samples together with
the normal samples of the target network are both used to train the classifier
of HIDE.
63
6.2.1 Attack Abstract EDtraction
Assume that AH is a measured attack sample, which contains both attack and normal
traffic. BA is the measure normal sample, which contains the normal traffic only.
Then the equations to calculate the attack instance are given in Equation 6.1
Where:
• i: itch bin of a PDA sample.
• AH t : is the measured attack traffic sample in the test network.
• BA t : is the measured normal traffic sample in the test network.
• NAIL: the number of samples of AH.
• NBA , : the number of samples of BA t .
• AA: is the calculated attack abstract instance.
• NAA: is the number of samples of AA.
6.2.2 Attack Transplant Sample Grafting
The attack sample grafting is the reversed process of the attack instance extraction
step. Airst, an attack abstract, AA, is randomly chosen from the Attack Record;
then, the attack transplant sample, AT g , is generated by grafting the selected attack
abstract onto a normal sample collected from the target network. The equation of
attack transplant grafting is given in Equation 6.2.
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.n of a PDA sample.
the calculated attack abstract instance.
is the number of samples of AA.
le normal traffic sample of the target production network.
the number of samples of BNp .
Please refer to [70] for the detailed information about the algorithms and the
pseudo codes of attack instance extraction and simulation.
6.2.3 PDF Figures of a Grafted Attack Sample
Example PDAs of the measured normal and the measured attack samples, the
extracted attack abstracts and the resulted attack transplant samples are plotted
in Aigure 6.2 for some parameter. Aigure 6.2ba) and Aigure 6.2bb) are the measured
normal and attack PDA samples in a test network. Aigure 6.2bc) is the extracted
attack abstract instance based on Aigure 6.2ba) and Aigure 6.2bb). Aigure 6.2bd)
and Aigure 6.2be) are the measured normal and attack samples in a target network.
Aigure 6.2bf) is the simulated attack transplant sample in the target network. Arom
the figures, it can be seen that, although the normal traffic samples in the two
networks are quite different bas seen by comparing Aigure 6.2ba) and Aigure 6.2bd)),
the simulated attack transplant sample is visually close to the measured attack sample
in the target network bas seen by comparing Aigure 6.2bf) and Aigure 6.2be)).
6.3 The OPNET EDperimental Results
The first experiment is designed to evaluate the performance of the "graft" and
"re-use" algorithms, when both the test and the target networks have similar network
settings. The OPNET simulation data sets bsee Section 3.5.1) are used in this
experiment.
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Figure 6.2 The PDA histograms corresponding to the steps utilized in estimating
an attack transplant sample of a parameter.
The 600kbps network bsee Table 3.1) serves as the test network bA). The
background and attack traffic data of the test network are used for training the test
classifier. This test classifier is used in the investigation of the efficacy of the re-use
classifier method. These data are also used to calculate the attack abstract instances
by using the algorithms described earlier that are part of the grafted classifier method.
The 2Mbps network bsee Table 3.1) serves as the production network bB). The
background traffic data of the network B are used to compute the background models
and then to estimate the attack models in the production network. The attack models
then generate simulated attack transplant samples for training.
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6.3.1 Model Similarities
To further quantify the similarities between the measured and the estimated models,
three different similarity measurements are calculated using the similarity equation
listed in Equation 3.3: b1) the similarity between the actual background model and
the actual measured attack model bcalled AaBa from now on) bhere the term "actual"
refers to measured, rather than estimated, quantities in the simulated network, not
live network data); b2) the similarity between the actual background model and the
estimated attack model bcalled Ae Ba from now on); b3) the similarity between the
actual attack model and the estimated attack model bcalled AeAa from now on); b4)
the similarity between the actual 600kbps-background model and the actual 2Mbps-
background model bcalled 13„600,Ba2, from now on). The average of the similarity
results are tabulated in Table 6.1.
In examining Table 6.1, it can be noticed that, when the attack level is very low
compared with the background, i.e., 10 to 50 kbps, all models are close to each other,
and in fact, none of the classifiers can reliably detect attacks. At higher attack levels,
i.e., 100-200 kbps and more, the estimated attack models remain very similar to the
measured attack models but different from the actual normal models. Therefore, these
results suggest that the attack models can be estimated with adequate correctness in
that they are quite similar to the actual models. The last column strongly indicates
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that the background at 600kbps and 2Mbps network conditions are consistently very
different from each other.
6.3.2 Comparison of Classification Performance
Three classification experiments are performed to examine the classification
performance outcomes of HIDE for the networks at hand for the two approaches,
the re-use and the grafted methods.
1. The actual PDA data of the production network B are used for the training,
testing and validation of the HIDE classifier. The results are used as the baseline
of the system performance in that they should be the best that can be achieved
for the actual 2 Mbps network. Aor simplicity, this experiment is called the
opticuc for experimental outcomes.
2. The generated PDA data, using the grafted classifier method, are used for
training the HIDE classifier, while the actual data are used for testing. The
results reflect the performance of the "grafted" method and are referred to as
the grafted method experiment.
3. The 600 kbps PDA data are used for both training and testing of the HIDE
classifier. Subsequently, the classifier is used to validate the PDA data from the
production network. Thus, this corresponds to examining the efficacy of the
"re-use" method and is to be referred to as the re-use method experiment.
The ROC bReceiver Operating Characteristic) curves of the three experiments
under different attack levels are plotted in Aigure 6.3.
Arom the figures, it can be seen that the classification performance of HIDE
improve, as the attack intensity gets higher, as expected. Also, the classification
performance of the opticuc measurements is best. As mentioned earlier, at the very
low attack levels, all classifiers are basically failing and any measured classification
results bear little meaning or interest; that is the case here for the 10 kbps graphs.
At higher, more meaningful, attack rates, the classification performance of the two
methods, the grafted and re-use classifiers, are quite encouraging and basically on par
with each other and only a little inferior to the opticuc results.
The misclassification rates of HIDE for the opticuc, grafted classifier and re-use
classifier experiments are listed in Table 6.2. The values seen in the table follow
what was observed from Aigure 6.3. The misclassification rates of the opticuc
experimental measurements are better but close to those found for the grafted
and re-use classifier experiments. This indicates that the latter two modeling and
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estimation algorithms can be used as effective starting points, when migrating an
anomaly IDS from the test network to an unfamiliar network setting, where accurate
attack models are not available. However, the grafted approach performs better as
the environment becomes increasingly unfamiliar.
6.4 The DARPA-CONEX TESTBED EDperimental Results
The second experiment is designed to evaluate the performance of these graft/reuse
approaches in detecting DoP attacks collected from two networks with disparate
network topologies and traffic models.
The DARPA IDEVAL network bsee Aigure 3.6) serves as the test network bA).
The background and the DoG attack traffic data are used as the training data to train
the "re-use" classifier. These data are also used to extract the attack profile in the
same way as the previous subsection.
The CONEX TESTBED network bsee Aigure 3.7) is used as the production
network bB). The background traffic data, together with the attack profile of the
DARPA IDEVAL network, are used to simulate the grafted attack samples, which in
turn are used to train the "graft" classifier.
In the same fashion as what has been done in Section 6.3.2, the three classifiers,
opticuc, grafted and re-use, are trained to detect the DoG attacks in the CONEX
TESTBED. The misclassification rates are listed in Table 6.3. As expected, the
opticuc classifier has the lowest misclassification rate, as low as 0.290%. The grafted
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classifier comes in second with a 0.791% error rate. The re-use classifier performs the
worst with a 1.58% misclassification rate.
Figure 6.4 The ROC curves of the CONEX TESTBED experiment.
The ROC curves of these three classifiers are plotted in Aigure 6.4. Aigure 6.4ba)
shows the ROC curves in the regular scales and Aigure 6.4bb) gives the details at the
upper left corner of Aigure 6.4ba), which is the region of interests. The figures show
that the detection bor true positive) rate of opticuc classifier is about eight percent
higher than the other two classifiers. Interestingly, the grafted approach has a slightly
lower false positive rate than the opticuc, which is highly desirable since high false
positive rates are the major drawback of intrusion detection systems.
The above observations show that the "graft" approach has a performance
advantage over the "reuse" approach in the terms of false positive and misclassification
rates, when both are used as bootstrapping classifiers of HIDE for the CONEX
TESTBED network.
6.5 Conclusion
The classifier of an IDS, which is well-trained in a test network, could be ill-trained in
an unfamiliar network setting. This is because, while typical background traffic data
are available in the new network, attack data usually is not. To solve this problem,
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two techniques, the re-use classifier and the grafted classifier methods, are proposed
and presented in this chapter to bootstrap the classifiers of a production network by
using the attack information obtained from a test network.
Two experiments have been carried out by using HIDE, an intrusion detection
prototype, to compare the opticuc outcomes bwhen the classifier knows the attacks in
the unfamiliar network) to the results for the grafted and re-use classification methods:
the first experiment used data sets generated by OPNET simulations at various
background and attack intensity settings; the second experiment used TCPDUMP
trace files derived from the DARPA intrusion detection evaluation projects and the
CONEX TESTBED network of the CONEX lab in NJIT.
It has been seen from the results of the first experiment bsee Section 6.3) that
the classification performance of the grafted and opticuc classifiers improves as the
attack intensity gets higher, while the classification performance of the opticuc are
the best in all scenarios, as expected. This indicates that the both algorithms, "graft"
and "re-use" , can be used as the bootstrapping approaches to train classifiers for a
new environment with insufficient attack information. The results of the second
experiment bsee Section 6.4) show that the grafted classifier has a performance edge
over the re-use classifier, especially in terms of false positive rates, which is highly
desirable for an IDS.
CHAPTER 7
RECONNAISSANCE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
This chapter describes the architectures, the algorithms and the experimental results
of the reconnaissance intrusion detection system bRIDS), which is designed to detect
P&S attacks and to discover the distributed stealthy attack scenarios.
Section 7.1 briefly reviews the existing literature in reconnaissance attack
detection. Section 7.2 introduces the architecture of the reconnaissance intrusion
detection system bRIDS). Section 7.3 describes the diagram and the algorithms of
RAP. Section 7.4 explains the details of the RAC system. Section 7.5 reports the
testing results of RAP and RAC on three different P&S attack data sets. Section 7.6
summarizes and concludes this chapter.
7.1 Literature Review in Reconnaissance Intrusion Detection
Reconnaissance attacks balso called probing and scanning attacks or P&L attacks) are
often used by hackers as the starting phase of a series of hostile activities by scanning
a set of addresses or ports, looking for vulnerabilities and possible penetrating points.
Therefore, it is important for an IDS to be able to accurately detect reconnaissance
attacks as early warnings for more serious attacks.
The state of the practice in P&L attack detection is surprisingly simple. Nearly
all commercial and open-source intrusion detection systems, e.g. NAR [25] and Bro [9],
etc, contain primitive modules to detect portscans and other forms of surveillance
activities by looking for X "events of interests" for host Y with Z seconds [71]. These
techniques can be easily defeated by attackers simply by increasing their scanning
interval or by using multiple hosts to simultaneous scanning a site.
Snort [41] uses three portscan detection methods. The first is a signature
detection method by matching packets with the pre-specified scan signatures. The
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second is connection-oriented method by using the simplistic method mentioned in the
previous paragraph. As of version 2.0, SNORT starts to include a new preprocessor
"flow-portscan" to detect surveillance attacks by scoring the flows accessing unopened
or unpopular services and generating alerts when a certain score threshold have been
exceeded.
Several research papers have been published to address the issue of scanning
detection using probabilistic methods. Staniford et al. [37] proposed algorithms
to detect scans based on the probability of accessing each destination host and
port. Leckie et al. [72] designed a probabilistic model to detect likely scan sources.
Robertson et al. [73] monitored failed connections attempts and used a simple
thresholding method to detect scans. Jung et al. [74] also monitored failed sessions
and used a threshold random watch algorithm to detect scanning sessions.
Figure 7.1 Reconnaissance intrusion detection system.
The reconnaissance detection system, Aigure 7.1, consists of two functional
subsystems:
• Reconnaissance Activity Profiler bRAP): is a session-based intrusion detection
module capable of detecting stealthy scanning and probing attacks. The
detailed information about RAP will be described in Section 7.3.
• Reconnaissance Activity Correlater bRAC): is an alert-correlation module to
correlate the alerts generated by RAPinto attack scenarios and to discover the
74
distributed stealthy attack scenarios. The detailed information about RAC will
be described in Section 7.4
7.3 Reconnaissance Activity Profiler
The RAP module processes the packets from the KAA module, builds sessions,
aggregates the sessions based on the client IP addresses, extracts and scores the session
features, classifies the features, and reports the alerts to both the security console and
to RAC module. As illustrated in Aigure 7.2, RAP consists of the following functional
sub-modules:
Figure 7.2 The diagram of the reconnaissance activity profiler.
• Session Assembly: assembles the packets into sessions. There are three
types of sessions: TCP sessions, UDP sessions, and ICMP sessions. Although
UDP and ICMP packets are essentially connectionless, the exchange of packets
between clients and servers does convey a lot of valuable information, which can
be utilized for the purpose of intrusion detection.
• Client Session Aggregation: aggregates all sessions according to their client
IP addresses. The aggregated behaviors of the attack clients significantly
differ from the behaviors of the normal users. Therefore, client-level session
aggregation is very useful for detecting attacks.
• Session Feature EDtraction and Scoring: extracts the features statistically
describing the behaviors of the sessions and their client addresses. It calculates
the probability scores these features by comparing the features with the
reference models of normal and attack users. The probability scores are
measurements indicating how likely for a feature to take the observed values.
• Reconnaissance Classifier: classifies the score vectors to detect
reconnaissance attacks. The positive battack) classification outputs are reported
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to both security console and to following RAC module. The negative bnormal)
samples are sent to the stealthy reconnaissance classifier for further detection.
• Stealthy Reconnaissance Classifier: detects the stealthy reconnaissance
activities by further analyzing the negatives of the non-stealthy classifier. It
will generate alters to RAC module for whenever stealthy attacks are detected.
7.3.1 Session Monitoring and Categorization
RAP monitors the sessions by rebuilding session dialogs between clients and servers.
RAP is designed to monitor three kinds of sessions: TCP, UDP and ICMP. These
sessions are aggregated according to their client IP address. Aor each client, a set of
timestamps and counters is used to describe the traffic activities.
Figure 7.3 The session categories.
The monitored sessions can be categorized into two categories according to their
activity patterns:
• Control Sessions: are the sessions exchanging control packets only.
• Data Sessions: are the sessions exchanging both control and data packets.
Based on control packets and the following state transition paths monitored,
sessions are also classified into three different categories:
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• Normal Sessions: are the sessions without any invalid control packets and
anomalous state transitions.
• Abnormal Sessions: are the sessions with some anomalous state transitions
but no invalid control packets. The possible causes for this kind of sessions are
either server busy or packet lost when sniffing.
• Suspicious Sessions: are the sessions with invalid control packets. Most
commonly these sessions are launched by attacks.
Sessions can also be classified according to their service definition:
• Defined Sessions: are sessions accessing the services that are open for normal
users.
• Undefined Sessions: are sessions accessing either non-existing services or
services not open to regular users.
Similar to the anomalous score described by Standiford et al. [37], RAP
calculates the session anomalous entropies Abs) using Equation 7.1:
Where Pbs) is the likelihood for a service s to be accessed; Pmax is the maximum
likelihood among all services; a is a predefined small constant coefficient to avoid logo
error, which is defined as 0.05 in our system.
7.3.2 RAP Events and Statistical Features
Whenever the state of a session changes, this session together with its correspondent
client aggregation will be inspected by RAP for possible anomalous activities. A
vector of session features, which statistically describes the session and client activities,
are extracted and compared with the reference models.
A RAP event is defined as a session state transition. Different fear' tures are
extracted from sessions of different protocols. The detailed description about these
features is given in Appendix A.2.
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7.3.3 Reference Models and Score Metrics
The extracted session features are then scored based on the information of the
reference models. The reference models are in fact probability density functions
bPDA) of the feature values. Differing from the reference models of HIDE, the
reference models of both normal users and attackers are maintained in RAP. Based
on the nature of these features, these reference models can be categorized into two
categories:
• Categorical Reference Models: are the reference models of features with discrete
values. Two sample categorical reference models are plotted in Aigure 7.4.
Aigure 7.4ba) is the reference model of normal users and Aigure 7.5bb) is the
reference model of attackers.
• Continuous Reference Models: are the reference models of features with
continuous values. Two sample continuous reference models are plotted
in Aigure 7.5. Aigure 7.5ba) is the reference model of normal users and
Aigure 7.5bb) is the reference model of attackers.
Two different score metrics are tested. Let x be the feature value, pabx) be the
probability of x in the normal reference model, pax) be the probability of x in the
attack reference model, npn,max be the maximum probability of the normal reference
model, and Da,max be the maximum probability of the attack reference model.
Arom the above equations, it can be seen that the score metric 1 essentially is
an anomaly detection approach by comparing feature values with the known normal
patterns, while the score metric 2 is a hybrid signature-anomaly detection approach
by utilizing both known normal and known attack knowledge. Aor simplicity, the
score metric 1 will be referred as "METRIC" and the score metric 2 will be referred
as "METRIC2" .
7.3.4 Session Classifier
The Back-Propagation Neural Networks are used as the session classifiers of RAP.
The inputs of the classifiers are the session feature score vectors and the outputs are
the classification results.
7.4 Reconnaissance Activity Correlater
The RAC module builds attack scenarios from the RAP alerts and tries to discover
the distributed attack scenarios. The diagram of RAC is shown in Aigure 7.6, which
consists of the following sub modules:
• Address-Based 	 Vertical 	 Alert 	 Correlation: 	 correlates RAP 	 alerts
vertically, which means all alerts with the same client/server addresses are
correlated together.
• Similarity-Based Horizontal Scenario Correlation:
	
horizontally
correlates attack scenarios, which means that scenarios that are temporally
and statistically similar will be fused bcorrelated) together into one scenario.
• Scenario Feature EDtraction and Scoring: extracts the statistical features
measuring the similarity between two scenarios. These features are then
compared with the known reference models.
• Scenario Feature Classification: classifies the feature scores and forwards
the scores to scenario fusion decision module.
• Scenario Correlation Decision: decides whether two scenarios are belong to
one distributed attack scenario and hence should be fused together.
7.4.1 Address-Based Vertical Alert Correlation
The alert correlation algorithm of RAC differs from the existing attack fusion
algorithms in that it divides the correlation task into two steps: vertical alert
correlation and horizontal scenario correlation. The underlying assumption is that
the alerts, which have the same client/server addressed pair and are temporally close,
always belong to the same attack scenario. This assumption is straightforward and
true for both the DARPA data and the data collected from the CONEX TESTBED
network.
The vertical alert correlation is invoked whenever RAC receives a new alert
from RAP; the horizontal alert correlation is more complicated and is invoked only
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at constant time interval. By splitting the attack fusion problem into two sub
problems and invoking related modules in different manners, the fusion accuracy
can be maximized by removing the unnecessary uncertainties and the mean time the
computation cost of alert correlations can be minimized.
When a new alert arrives from the RAP module, the vertical alert correlation
module first searches the scenario table for a scenario with the same client/server
address pair as the alert. If the scenario is not found, a new scenario is created;
otherwise, the statistics of corresponding scenario is updated by the new alert.
Scenarios will be purged from the scenario table after a certain inactive period.
Figure 7.7 Sample scenario sets.
As stated in the previous subsection, the horizontal scenario correlation function
is invoked at a constant time interval, e.g. every 60 seconds. When invoked, it first
divides all the existing scenarios into two sets: the first set Cnew  includes the scenarios
that have been updated since the last horizontal correlation; the second set C old
includes the scenarios that were not updated since the last correlation.
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The scenarios in Set Gnew are compared with both the other scenarios in Gnew
and the scenarios in Set G old one by one to determine whether they actually are
correlated. Aor the sample scenarios in Aigure 7.7, the binding strengths between
scenario Si in set Gnew is and the rest scenarios in Gnew and Gold are calculated as
a full search for possible correlated scenarios. However, no separate full search will
be conducted for the scenarios in Set Cold, because no new information is available
for these "old" scenarios.
Figure 7.8 The horizontal scenario correlation.
The flow chart to calculate scenario binding strength is shown in Aigure 7.8.
A vector of statistical features describing the similarity between the two scenarios
is extracted. This feature vector is then scored using feature scoring metrics and
the learned reference information. A neural network is used to classify the feature
scores into a scenario binding strength, which is a comprehensive measurement about
the overall similarity of the two scenarios in question. The binding strength is a
continuous value, ranging from -1 bsame) to 1 bdifferent).
7.4.3 RAC Events and Statistical Features
In RAC, an event is defined as an alert generated by RAP. Totally 28 statistical
features are monitored by RAC to describe the statistical similarities between two
scenarios. A detailed description of the extracted scenario features is given in
Appendix A.3. The feature scoring algorithms are the same as the scoring algorithms
of session features described in Section 7.3.3.
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7.4.4 Scenario Classification
A Back-Propagation neural network is used as the scenario classifier. The inputs of
the classifier are the scenario feature score vectors from the "Aeature Scoring" module
in Aigure 7.8. The outputs of the classifier are the scenario binding strengths.
7.4.5 Correlation Decision
The decision of scenario correlation has profound impact on the system performance.
A false decision to mistakenly merge two uncorrelated scenarios could corrupt all the
results after that. The purpose of this algorithm is to design an effective decision-
making approach, with as few false alarms as possible, on fusing two scenarios.
Figure 7.9 Scenario correlation decision.
The block diagram of the scenario correlation decision module is shown in
Aigure 7.9. In the figure, Scenario A and Scenario B are the two scenarios need
to be inspected; bA,B is the binding strength between A and B; rA,B represents the
address relationship between A and B, which will be elaborated in Subsection 7.4.5;
and dA,B is the correlation decision.
Terminologies
To facilitate the description of the correlation decision algorithm, the definitions
of several terminologies are given as below:
• Scenario: is the aggregate of the RAP alerts according to their client/server
address pairs. In the rest of this chapter, scenarios are represented by capital
letters, e.g. A, B, C
83
• Binding Strength: is the output of the neural classifier to indicate the closeness
between two scenarios. It ranges from —1 to 1. The closer is the binding
strength to —1, the more similar are the two scenarios. In the rest of this
chapter, binding strength between two scenarios A, B at time t is denoted as
dtbA, B).
• Address Relationship: indicates the geographical relationship among the
scenarios in the scenario diagram. The definitions of scenario diagram and
the scenario address relationship will be given in the next subsection. The
symbol RA,B is used to symbolize the address relationship between scenario A
and scenario B.
• Correlation Decision: is the output of this algorithm. It equals to either
"CORRELATED" or "UNCORRELATED" . "CORRELATED" indicates that
the two scenarios are correlated and actually belong to one distributed scenario,
therefore they should be fused together; "UNCORRELATED" means that the
two scenarios look different. Binding decision between scenario A and B at time
window t is symbolized as dt bA, B).
A Sample Scenario Diagram
A sample diagram of different scenarios is illustrated in Aigure 7.10. The x-axis
is the client IP address; and the y-axis is the server IP address. Seven scenarios bA,
Figure 7.10 A sample diagram of attack scenarios.
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The address relationships among the scenarios are defined as below:
• VERTICAL Relationships: are the scenarios that have the same client IP
address, e.g. B and C.
• HORIZONTAL Relationships: are the scenarios that have the same server IP
address, e.g. A and B, and C and D.
• CROSSING Relationships: are the scenarios that do not share the same
client/server IP addresses, e.g. A and C, A and D, B and D, A and F, A
and G, etc.
The VERTICAL address relationship occurs when an attacker scan two servers
simultaneously. This kind of attacks is very common in both stealthy and none-
stealthy attack scenarios and can be easily detected with high accuracy. Therefore,
the RAC system should be able to identify this relationship and fuse the vertical-
neighboring scenarios promptly.
The HORIZONTAL address relationship happens when attackers launch
coordinated attacks scanning server. This kind of attacks is not common but
does happen in mostly stealthy attack scenarios. RAC can detect the horizontally
distributed scenarios but with less certainty. Therefore, it should be cautious when
making the decision to fuse the horizontal scenarios.
The CROSSING address relationship happens mostly among irrelevant attack
scenarios or even among false positives. Only in very rare cases, attacker may
launch distributed attacks from different sources probing different victim machines.
Therefore, it should be very conservative in fusing scenarios with this kind of address
relationship.
The RAC Correlation Decision Algorithm
Based on the above observations, a RAC correlation decision algorithm is
devised and visualized in Aigure 7.11. In the figure, t is the discrete time window
index; Cc, CH and Cc are the three constants indicating how many consecutive
before making a "CORRELATED" decision and fusing the two scenarios.
The basic idea of the RAC decision algorithm is to be conservative, when
correlating/fusing two scenarios, by using multiple consecutive "positive" observations
so that the isolated "false positives" can be filtered and avoided. By adjusting
the three constants, Cm, CH and Cc, the RAC differentiates the likelihood that
a "positive" binding strength is actually a "true positive" based on the address
relationship between the two scenarios. In this way, a balance between the correlation
accuracy and promptness can be achieved and easily configurable by administrators.
7.5 EDperimental Results
Three different data sets, which are the DARPA'98 data set, the COAEX TESTBED
non-stealthy data set and the CONEX TESTBED stealthy data set, have been used
to test the performance of RAP and RAC.
RAC Evaluation Criteria
Same as before, the false positives, false negatives, and misclassifications can
be used to evaluate the performance of RAC, but the definitions of these three
measurements are slightly different from before.
• Aalse Positives: are the instances that two uncorrelated scenarios are mistakenly
classified as correlated.
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• Aalse Negatives: are the instances that two correlated scenarios are mistakenly
classified as uncorrelated.
• Misclassifications: are the instances of either false positives or false negatives.
7.5.1 Results on the DARAPA'98 Data Set
In this experiment, the RAP is trained to detect the TCP-related reconnaissance
attacks b"portsweep" , "nmap" and "ratan" ) within the DARPA'98 data set. Aive days
of traffic bby98w8d8, y98w6d4, y98w6dW, y98w6d4 and y98w7dW) within the DARPA'98
training data set are tested. The detection results are listed in Table 7.1.
Arom Table 7.1, it can be seen that both Metric 1 and Metric 2 performed
very well in detecting reconnaissance attacks with very low misclassification rates. In
comparison, Metric 2 could have a small performance advantage over Metric 1.
Because there is no distributed reconnaissance attack scenario in the DARPA'98
data, only the vertical correlation algorithm can be tested. The attack scenarios in
the y98w6dW TCPDUMP trace files are listed in Table 7.2 as examples of the vertical
scenarios discovered by RAC.
In the table, the "start time" and the "duration" are the starting time and
the duration of the attack scenario; "Server" is the IP address of the victim server;
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"Client" is the IP address of the attacker; "Ssns" is the number of attack sessions
detected; and "Tv" is the average period of the attack sessions bin seconds/scan).
Arom Table 7.2, it can be seen that the TCPDUMP trace file of the Tuesday of
Week 6 contains the following four independent scanning scenarios.
1. Scenario 1 is a stealthy "portsweep" scenario with 97 scans at the average scan
interval of 226 seconds;
2. Scenario 2 is a clear "portsweep" scenario with 300 scans at the scan interval
close to 0 seconds;
3. Scenario 3 is a clear "satan" attack;
4. Scenario 4 is a "portsweep" scenario with 1024 scan sessions at the rate of 2.1
seconds per scan.
7.5.2 Results on the CONEX TESTBED Non-Stealthy Attacks
Aon-stealthy PlP attacks are simulated within the COAEX TESTBED network
bsee Aigure 3.7). In the simulation, the non-stealthy P&P attacks are defined as
distributed attack scenarios with short to medium probing intervals ranging from 2
seconds to 2 minutes. The RAP detection results on the non-stealthy data set, using
both METRIC and METRIC2, are listed in Table 7.3.
The results in Table 7.3 show that RAP can reliably detect non-stealthy P&S
attacks with very low false negative rate and zero false positive rate.
Table 7.4 gives the detection performance of RAC on the non-stealthy data set.
Arom the table, it can be seen that the METRIC2 has much lower false positive rates
than the METRIC1. This is highly desirable, because, as stated in Section 7.4.5, a
Table 7.3 RAP Detection Results on the Non-Stealthy Data Set
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Table 7.4 RAC Detection Results on the Non-Stealthy Data Set
false positive bmistakenly merging two uncorrelated scenarios) could corrupt all the
results after that.
7.5.3 Results on the CONEX TESTBED Stealthy Attacks
Stealthy PlS attacks, which are defined as distributed scanning attacks with medium
bstarting from 5 minutes) to long bup to 1 hour) scan intervals, are also simulated
within the CONEX TESTBED network. The RAP detection results on stealthy
attacks are tabulated in Table 7.5. The table shows that RAP can detect all stealthy
scanning attacks without a single false positive.
Similar to the RAP detection results, the RAC detection results of METRIC1
and METRIC2 are evaluated and listed in Table 7.6. The misclassification rate of
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METRIC2 is once again lower than that of METRIC1. This hints that the METRIC2
could be more accurate in correlating attack scenario. The misclassification rates of
the both metrics are relatively high when comparing the results of non-stealthy attacks
bsee Table 7.4). This indicates that distributed stealthy attack scenarios, which are
widely separated in time and the address/port spaces, are much more difficult to be
correctly correlated than the non-stealthy scan scenarios.
Table 7.7 lists the performance of RAC decision module at different
combinations of Cc, CH and Cc. The last three columns of the table give the
numbers of merging decisions and the numbers of false merging decisions in the
format of "number of merging decisions/number of false decisions". The "Vertical"
column corresponds to the performance when merging scenarios of VERTICAL
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Table 7.7 The RAC Decision Results of CONEX TESTBED Stealthy Data
address relationship; the "Horizontal" column corresponds to the performance
when merging scenarios with HORIZONTAL address relationship; and the "Cross"
column corresponds to the performance when merging scenarios with CROSS address
relationship.
When Cm, CH and Cc are all set to one, there are 12 false merges out of the
total 32 merges. As Cm, CH and Cc are set to larger values, the number of merges
and the number of false merges become smaller. When Cm, CH and Cc are set to
three, three and four, respectively, the number of false merge becomes zero. This
indicates that, by selecting proper Cc , CH and Cc, the RAC decision module can
significantly reduce the number of false merges.
7.6 Comparison and Conclusion
Almost all the existing literatures used different data sets, most of which are not
publicly accessible. Many of these publications used network logs collected from real
networks, which do not have the necessary attack truth. Therefore, a fair comparison
on the reconnaissance detection performance among these systems is difficult. Instead,
some of the existing results on P&S attacks are listed as below:
1. The best P&S detection result in the DARPA'98 IDEVAL project can detect
"almost 90% of the probes but with very few false alarms" [45]. The DARPA'98
IDEVAL project used "session" as the unit of events.
2. The best P&S detection results in DARPA'99 IDEVAL project can detect about
70% of all probes with 10 false alarms per day bsee Aigure 3 of [46]). The
DARPA'99 IDEVAL project used "attack instance" as the unit of events
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3. Leckie et al. [72] tested their systems using packet logs from two sources. The
event unit they used was "traffic source" , which is very similar to the definition
of attack scenarios of RAC. According to the paper, the false positive rate was
70%.
The following conclusions can be got from the results shown in the above section:
• RAP is a very promising session-based ID system to detect reconnaissance
attacks, stealthy or non-stealthy. Some early results indicate that RAP can
detect attacks with high detection rates and very low false alarm rates.
• RAC can reliably discover distributed non-stealthy scanning scenarios with very
low misclassification rates. The misclassification rates for the stealthy scenarios
are relatively higher that the non-stealthy scenario, but, when considering the
difficulty of correlating stealthy scenarios, these results are still regarded as very
good.
• The performance of the score metric 2 is consistently better than the score
metric 1.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presented the research efforts to apply PDA statistics and neural
network classification in network intrusion detection and alert correlation. The
following research topics have been addressed and reported in the dissertation:
8.1 The System Architecture and the Statistical Model of HIDE
HIDE, a hierarchical statistical anomaly intrusion detection systems to detect DoS
attacks, were presented in Chapter 3. The system had been tested by three different
data sets: the OPNET simulation, the DARPA'98 intrusion detection evaluation
data and the CONEX TESTBED data. The results indicated that HIDE can reliably
detect DoS attacks with very false positive and false negative rates.
8.2 HIDE Feature Subset Selection
Experiments to select feature subsets important for HIDE to detect DoS attacks had
been carried out and report in Chapter 4. The experimental results indicated that, by
selecting proper feature subset, HIDE can effectively reduce the number of monitored
features from 45 to 8.
8.3 Systematic Research Efforts to Optimize the Performance of HIDE
Various research activities to optimize the performance of HIDE had been performed.
The results and conclusions are reported in Chapter 5, which include:
1. The study of the PDF binning schemes
The study on three different PDA binning algorithms, which are used to build
and to represent probability density functions in computer systems, had been
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carried out and reported in Section 5.1. The results showed that the "percentile"
partition with 16 bins could be the optimum choice for the trade off between
the computation complexity and the system performance.
2. Compressing PDFs using wavelet compressions
Aour different wavelet algorithms, Naar, sycW, coif8 and dd4, with various
compression ranges, were tested to compress PDAs generated by HIDE bsee
Section 5.2). The results showed that all four wavelet bases could reliably
compress the PDAs from 64 bin values to 16 to 28 wavelet coefficients
bcompression range 3), without major performance deterioration. Among the
four wavelet algorithms, the sycW wavelet family seemed to perform the best.
3. The study of similarity metrics
The effectiveness of four different similarity metrics, which are used to measure
the similarity distances between two PDAs, has been investigated in Section 5.3.
By comparing and analyzing the experimental results of these metrics, the AKS
bsee Equation 3.3) was chosen as the similarity metric of HIDE.
4. The study of neural network classifiers
As the kernels of intrusion detection systems, classifiers have profound impacts
on the system performance and efficiency. Experiments had been conducted and
reported in Section 5.4 to evaluate five different types of neural networks with
various numbers of hidden neurons. The results indicated that BP and PBH
networks provide more efficient classification results than the other alternatives.
8.4 Methods of Classifier Training in a Production Network
Two different algorithms to train ID classifiers in a production network using the
information gathered from a test network, graft and re-use, had been studied and
reported in Chapter 6. The results showed that the both algorithms can be used as the
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bootstrapping approaches to train classifiers for a new environment with insufficient
attack information.
8.5 Reconnaissance Intrusion Detection System
The architectures and the detection algorithms of the proposed reconnaissance
intrusion detection system bRIDS), which consists of two consecutive modules, RAP
and RAC, had been presented in Chapter 7 to detect PPS attacks and to discover
distributed scan scenarios. The results showed the systems can reliably detect
reconnaissance attacks and discover distributed reconnaissance scenarios.
APPENDIX A
MONITORED STATISTICAL FEATURES
This appendix gives the detailed descriptions on the statistical features monitored by
HIDE, RAP and RAC.
A.1 The HIDE Features
The HIDE is capable of monitoring traffic into and out of the protected network. The
HIDE statistical features can be categorized based on the protocols of network traffic.
A.1.1 The IP Features
Six IP traffic parameters can be monitored by HIDE.
I. IP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of the IP packet
lengths within a time window. Aor simplicity, this parameter is symbolized as
"ip-pkt-len" afterward.
2. IP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the packet
rates of all observed IP packets within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "ip-pkt-rate" afterward.
3. IP Byte Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the byte rates of
all observed IP packets within a time window. This feature will be symbolized
as "ip-pkt-rate" afterward.
4. IP Fragment Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the packet
rates of all observed IP fragments within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "ip-frag-rate" afterward.
5. IP Defragmentation Error Rate measures the averages and the distributions
of the IP defragmentation error rates occurred within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "ip-defrag-error" afterward.
6. IP Checksum Error Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the
IP checksum error rates occurred within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "ip-csum-error" afterward.
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A.1.2 The TCP Features
The HIDE is capable of monitoring 14 different kinds of TCP-related traffic features.
1. TCP Invalid Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the
rates of the TCP packets with invalid combinations of TCP control flags. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-pkt-invalid".
2. TCP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of the
lengths of IP packets within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as
"tcp-pkt-len".
3. TCP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the TCP
packet rates within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-
pkt-rate" .
4. TCP SYN Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the
rates of TCP control packets with SYN flag set within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-syn-pkt-rate" afterward.
5. TCP FIN Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the
rates of TCP control packets with AIN flag set within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-fin-pkt-rate" afterward.
6. TCP RST Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of the
rates of TCP control packets with RST flag set within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-rst-pkt-rate" afterward.
7. TCP Connection Open Rate measures the averages and the distributions
of the TCP connection open rates within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-con-new-opened" afterward.
8. TCP Connection Close Rate measures the averages and the distributions
of the TCP connection close rate within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-con-new-closed" afterward.
9. TCP Connection Abort Rate measures the averages and the distributions
of the TCP connection abort rate bconnection closed by RESET or TIMEOUT
other than normal three-way hand shaking) within a time window. This feature
will be symbolized as "tcp-con-new-aborted" afterward.
10.TCP Connections from Different Source Address measures the
distributions of TCP connections from different source IP addresses within a
time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-con-diff-src" afterward.
11. TCP Connection to Different Destination Address measures the
distributions of TCP connections to different destination IP addresses within a
time window. This feature will be symbolized as "tcp-con-diff-dst" afterward.
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12.TCP Connection Anomalous Entropy measures the averages and the
distributions of the anomalous entropies of all TCP connections within a time
window. This feature was first proposed in Staniford [37]. The equation to
calculate the connection anomalous entropy is given in Equation 7.1. This
feature will be symbolized as "tcp-con-anomalous-entropy" afterward.
13.TCP Connection Half Opened Ratio measures the averages and the
distributions of the ratio between the half-opened TCP connections and all
TCP connections within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as
"tcp-con-half-opened-ratio" afterward.
14. TCP Connection Duration measures the averages and the distributions of
the TCP connection durations within a time window. This feature will be
symbolized as "tcp-con-duration" afterward.
A.1.3 The UDP Features
The HIDE can be configured to monitor five different UDP-related trafflc features.
1. UDP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of UDP
packets within a time window. This feature is symbolized as "icmp-pkt-len"
afterward.
2. UDP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of UDP
packets within a time window. This feature will be referred as "icmp-pkt-rate"
afterward.
3. UDP Byte Rate measures the averages and the distributions of UDP packets
within a time window. This feature will be referred as "icmp-byt-rate" afterward.
4. UDP Packets from Different Sources measures the distributions of UDP
packets from different IP addresses. This feature will be referred as "icmp-diff-
src" afterward.
5. UDP Packet to Different Destinations measures the distributions of UDP
packets destined to different IP addresses. This feature will be referred as
"icmp-diff-dst" afterward.
A.1.4 The ICMP Features
The HIDE can monitor seven different UDP-related trafflc features.
1. ICMP Packet Length measures the averages and the distributions of UDP
packet lengths within a time window. This feature will be referred as "
icmp-pkt-rate" afterward.
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2. ICMP Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of ICMP
packets within a time window. This feature will be symbolized as "icmp-pkt-
rate" afterward.
3. ICMP Packets from Different Sources measures the distributions of ICMP
packets originated from different IP addresses within a time window. This
feature will be symbolized as "icmp-diff-src" afterward.
4. ICMP Packet to Different Destinations measures the distributions of
ICMP packets destined to different IP addresses within a time window. This
feature will be referred as "icmp-diff-dst" afterward.
5. ICMP Anomalous Echo Replies measures the averages and the distributions
of anomalous ICMP echo replies, which are ICMP echo reply packets without
previous echo request packets, within a time window. This feature will be
referred as "icmp-anomalous-echo-reply" afterward.
6. ICMP DUR Packet Rate measures the averages and the distributions of
ICMP DUR bdestination-Unreachable) packets within a time window. This
feature will be referred as "icmp-dur-pkt-rate" afterward.
A.1.5 Features in the OPNET Data Set
To detect the UDP flooding attacks simulated in the OPNET data set bsee
Section 3.5.1 for detailed information), ten traffic features are monitored by HIDE.
They are: in.ip-pkt-len, in.ip-pkt-rate, in.ip-byt-rate, in.ip-diff-src, in.ip-diff-dst,
icmp-pkt-raten, in.icmp-pkt-rate, in.icmp-byt-rate, in.icmp-diff-src and in.icmp-difft.
A.1.6 Features in the DARPA'98 and CONEX TESTBED Data Sets
Aorty-five traffic parameters are monitored by HIDE to detect the DoS attacks
in the DARPA'98 data set bsee Section 3.5.2) and the CONEX TESTBED data
set bsee Section 3.5.3). They are: in.ip-pkt-len, in.ip-pkt-rate, in.ip-byt-rate, in.ip-
frag-rate, in.ip-defrag-error-rate, in.ip-csum-error-rate, in.tcp-pkt-len, in.tcp-pkt-rate,
in.tcp-syn-pkt-rate, in.tcp-fin-pkt-rate, in.tcp-rst-pkt-rate, in.tcp-con-new-opened,
in.tcp-con-new-closed, in.tcp-con-new-aborted, in.tcp-con-half-opened-ratio, in.tcp-
con-duration, in. tcp-con-diff-src, in.tcp-con-diff-dst, in. tcp-con-anomalous-entropy,
in.icmp-pkt-len, in.icmp-pkt-rate, in.icmp-byt-rate, in.icmp-diff-src, in.icmp-diff-
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dst, in.udp-pkt-len, in.icmp-pkt-rate, in.udp-byt-rate, in.icmp-diff-src, in.udp-diff-
dst, out.ip-pkt-len, out.ip-pkt-rate, out.ip-byt-rate, out.tcp-pkt-len, out.tcp-pkt-
rate, out.tcp-con-diff-src, out.tcp-con-diff-dst, out.icmp-pkt-len, out.icmp-pkt-rate,
out.icmp-diff-src, out.icmp-diff-dst, out.icmp-pkt-len, out.icmp-pkt-rate, out.icmp-diff-
src, out.icmp-diff-dst and io.icmp-anomalous-echo-reply.
A.2 The RAP Features
The RAP is capable of detecting TCP, UDP and ICMP reconnaissance attacks.
Different feature sets are monitored to detect attacks of different protocols.
A.2.1 The TCP Features
In the current implementation, twenty-seven statistical features are monitored by
RAP to detect TCP scanning attacks. They are:
1. Session Action ID, or tcp-ssn-act-id, is an enumerated number to describe
the session transition action, e.g. session opened, session established, and session
closed.
2. Client Number of Sessions, or tcp-total-ssns, is the total number of sessions
from the client.
3. Client In-bound Session Ratio, or tcp-in-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between the
number of inbound sessions and the total number of sessions.
4. Client Out-bound Session Ratio, or tcp-out-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of outbound sessions and the total number of sessions.
5. Client Open Session Ratio, or tcp-open-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between the
number of half-open sessions and the total number of sessions.
6. Client Established Session Ratio, or tcp-estab-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of established sessions and the total number of sessions.
7. Client Closed Session Ratio, or tcp-close-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between the
number of closed sessions and the total number of sessions.
8. Client Rejected Session Ratio, or tcp-reset-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of sessions rejected by servers and the total number of sessions.
9. Client Normal Session Ratio, or tcp-normal-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of normal sessions and the total number of sessions.
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10. Client Abnormal Session Ratio, or tcp-abnorm-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of abnormal sessions and the total number of sessions.
11. Client Suspicious Session Ratio, or tcp-susp-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of suspicious sessions and the total number of sessions.
12. Client Control Session Ratio, or tcp-control-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of control sessions and the total number of sessions.
13. Client Data Session Ratio, or tcp-data-ssn-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of data sessions and the total number of sessions.
14. Client Defined Session Ratio, or tcp-defined-ssn-ratio, is the ratio between
the number of defined sessions and the total number of session.
15. Client Undefined Session Ratio, or tcp-undefined-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of undefined sessions and the total number of sessions.
16. Client Session Status, or tcp-mean-ssn-status, is the average session status
of all sessions.
17. Client Average Session Entropy, or tcp-mean-ssn-entropy, is the average
session entropy of all sessions.
18. Client Average Session Duration, or tcp-mean-ssn-duration, is the average
session duration of all sessions.
19. Session Direction, or tcp-ssn-direction, is the direction of the session b0 for
inbound sessions; and 1 for outbound sessions).
20. Session Server Protocol State, or tcp-server-state, is an enumerated sever
state of the session.
21. Session Client Protocol State, or tcp-server-state, is an enumerated client
state of the session.
22. Session Status, or tcp-ssn-status, is an enumerated number to describe the
overall session state, which inclicmes both client and server states b0 indicates
an "open" session; 1 indicates an "established" session; 2 indicates a "closed"
session; and 3 indicates that the session is rejected).
23. Session Normality, or tcp-ssn-direction, is an enumerate number for the
session normality b0 for normal sessions; 1 for abnormal sessions; and 2 for
suspicious sessions).
24. Session Type, or tcp-ssn-cntrl-data, is an enumerate number for session types
b0 for control session, within which no real data is exchanged; 1 for data
sessions).
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25. Session Service Definition, or tcp-ssn-definition, is an enumerated number
indicating whether the service is defined or not b0 for defined services; 1 for
undefined services).
26. Session Entropy, or tcp-ssn-entropy, is the entropy of the session bsee
Equation 7.1).
27. Session Duration, or tcp-ssn-duration, is the duration of the session.
A.2.2 The ICMP Features
The following features are monitored by RAP to detect ICMP scanning attacks.
1. ICMP Session Action ID, or icmp-ssn-act-id, is an enumerated number to
describe the ICMP session transition action, e.g. session opened, session reset,
and session closed.
2. Client Number of ICMP Sessions, or icmp-total-ssns, is the total number
of ICMP sessions from the client.
3. Client In-bound ICMP Session Ratio, or icmp-in-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of inbound ICMP sessions and the total number of ICMP
sessions.
4. Client Out-bound ICMP Session Ratio, or icmp-out-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of outbound ICMP sessions and the total number of ICMP
sessions.
5. Client ICMP RESET Session Ratio, or icmp-reset-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of ICMP sessions, being rejected by ICMP DUR packets
from the other side, and the total number of ICMP sessions.
6. Client ICMP One-Way Session Ratio, or icmp-one-way-ssn-ratio, is the
ratio between the number of one-way ICMP sessions, ICMP sessions with only
one-way traffic observed, to the total number of UDP sessions.
7. Client ICMP ECHO Session Ratio, or icmp-echo-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of ICMP ECHO sessions bsessions of ICMP ECHO request
/ ECHO reply packets) and the total number of ICMP sessions.
8. Client ICMP RESET ECHO Session Ratio, or icmp-echo-reset-ratio, is
the ratio between the number of ICMP reset ECHO sessions and the total
number of ICMP sessions.
9. Client ICMP One-Way ECHO Session Ratio, or icmp-echo-one-way-ratio,
is the ratio between the number of ICMP one-way ECHO sessions and the total
number of ICMP ECHO sessions.
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10. Client ICMP MASK Session Ratio, or icmp-mask-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of ICMP ADDRESS sessions, sessions of ICMP address
mask request/reply packets, and the total number of ICMP sessions.
11. Client ICMP RESET MASK Session Ratio, or icmp-mask-reset-ratio,
is the ratio between the number of ICMP reset MASK sessions and the total
number of ICMP MASK sessions.
12. Client ICMP One-Way MASK Session Ratio, or icmp-mask-one-way-
ratio, is the ratio between the number of ICMP one-way MASK sessions and
the total number of ICMP MASK sessions.
13. Client ICMP TIMESTAMP Session Ratio, or icmp-time-ssn-ratio, is the
ratio between the number of ICMP TIMESTAMP sessions, sessions of ICMP
timestamp request/reply packets, and the total number of UDP sessions.
14. Client ICMP RESET TIMESTAMP Session Ratio, or icmp-time-reset-
ratio, is the ratio between the number of ICMP reset TIMESTAMP sessions
and the total number of ICMP TIMESTAMP sessions.
15. Client ICMP One-Way TIMESTAMP Session Ratio, or icmp-time-one-
way-ratio, is the ratio between the number of ICMP one-way TIMESTAMP
sessions and the total number of ICMP TIMESTAMP sessions.
16. Client ICMP Misc. Session Ratio, or icmp-misc-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of ICMP sessions that do not belong to the above stated
sessions and the total number of ICMP sessions.
17. Client ICMP RESET Misc. Session Ratio, or icmp-misc-reset-ratio, is the
ratio between the number of ICMP reset misc. sessions and the total number
of ICMP misc. sessions.
18. Client ICMP One-Way Misc. Session Ratio, or icmp-misc-one-way-ratio,
is the ratio between the number of ICMP one-way misc. sessions and the total
number of ICMP misc. sessions.
19. ICMP Session Direction, or icmp-ssn-direction, is an enumerated number
indicating the direction of the session b0 for inbound; and 1 for outbound).
20. ICMP Session Type, or icmp-ssn-type, is an enumerate number of ICMP
session type, e.g. ECHO, MASK, TIMESTAMP, etc.
21. ICMP Session Status, or icmp-ssn-status, is an enumerate number of ICMP
session status b0 for two-way session; 1 for one-way session; 2 for reset session).
22. ICMP Session Request/Reply Ratio, or icmp-ssn-req-rep-ratio, is the ratio
between the ICMP request packets and the UDP reply packets.
23. ICMP Session Duration, or icmp-ssn-duration, is the duration of the ICMP
session.
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A.2.3 The UDP Features
The RAP monitors the following features of UDP clients to detect UDP P&G attacks.
1. Client UDP Session Action ID, or icmp-ssn-act-id, is an enumerate number
describing the UDP session transition action.
2. Client Number of UDP Sessions, or icmp-total-ssns, is the total number of
UDP sessions from the client.
3. Client In-bound UDP Session Ratio, or icmp-in-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of inbound UDP sessions and the total number of UDP
sessions.
4. Client Out-bound UDP Session Ratio, or icmp-out-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of outbound UDP sessions and the total number of UDP
sessions.
5. Client UDP RESET Session Ratio, or icmp-reset-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of reset UDP sessions bsessions rejected by the other side
using ICMP DUR packets) and the total number of UDP sessions.
6. Client UDP One-Way Session Ratio, or icmp-one-way-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of one-way UDP sessions bsessions with only one-way traffic
observed) and the total number of UDP sessions.
7. Client UDP Defined Session Ratio, or icmp-defined-ssn-ratio, is the ratio
between the number of inbound UDP sessions accessing "defined" services and
the total number of inbound UDP sessions.
8. Client UDP Average Session Entropy, or icmp-mean-ssn-entropy, is the
average entropy of all UDP sessions from the client.
9. Client Average Session Duration, or icmp-mean-ssn-duration, is the average
duration of all UDP sessions.
10. UDP Session Direction, or icmp-ssn-direction, is the direction of the UDP
session b0 for inbound; and 1 for outbound).
11. UDP Session Status, or icmp-ssn-status, is an enumerated number of UDP
session status, e.g. ONE-WAY, TWO-WAY and RESET.
12. UDP Session Entropy, or icmp-ssn-entropy, is the anomalous entropy of the
UDP session.
13. UDP Session Service Definition, or icmp-ssn-definition, is an enumerated
number indicating whether the accessed UDP service is defined or not b0 for
defined UDP services; and 1 for undefined services).
14.UDP Session Duration, or icmp-ssn-duration, is the duration of the UDP
session.
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A.3 The RAC Features
Twenty-eight scenario features are monitored by RAC to measure the similarity
between two scenarios. They are:
1. Start Time Difference, or start-time-duff, is the difference between the
scenario start times.
2. Last Alert Time Difference, or last-alert-time-diff, is the difference of the
times of the last alerts.
3. Duration Ratio, or duration-ratio, is the ratio between the durations of the
two scenarios.
4. Alert Number Ratio, or alert-num-ratio, is the ratio between the numbers
of alerts of the two scenarios.
5. Alert Rate Ratio, or alert-rate-ratio, is the ratio between the alert rates of
the two scenarios.
6. Session Number Ratio, or ssn-num-ratio, is the ratio between the numbers
of alert sessions of the two scenarios.
7. Session Rate Ratio, or ssn-rate-ratio, is the ratio between the rates of the
alert sessions of the two scenarios.
8. Defined Service Ratio, or defined-srv-ratio, is the ratio between the numbers
of the accessed "defined" services of the two scenarios.
9. Undefined Service Ratio, or undefined-srv-ratio, is the ratio between the
numbers of the accessed "undefined" services of the two scenarios.
10.Defined/Undefined Service Ratio, or def-undef-srv-ratio, is the ratio
between the defined/undefined service rates of the two scenarios.
11. Scenario Suspicious Ratio, or susp-ratio, is the ratio between the average
scenario suspiciousness, which are the outputs of the RAP classifier.
12. Scenario Entropy Ratio, or entropy-ratio, is the ratio between the average
scenario entropies.
13. Server Site Overlapping, or server-site-overlap, is the ratio between the
numbers of equivalent server addresses and the total number of different server
addresses.
14. Server Alert Overlapping, or server-alert-overlap, is the ratio between the
numbers of alerts to the same servers of the two scenarios and the total number
of scenarios.
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15. Client Site Overlapping, or client-site-overlap, is the ratio between the
numbers of equivalent client addresses and the total number of different client
addresses.
16. Client Alert Overlapping, or client-alert-overlap, is the ratio between the
numbers alerts from the same clients and the total number of alerts.
17. Server Network Overlapping, or server-net-overlap, is the ratio of the
maximum number of overlapping "1" bits in the server network masks of two
scenarios.
18. Client Network Overlapping, or client-net-overlap, is the ratio of the
maximum number of overlapping "1" bits in the client network masks of two
scenarios.
19. Sever Port Site Overlapping, or server-port-site-overlap, is the ratio between
the numbers of equivalent server ports and the total number of different server
ports.
20. Server Port Alert Overlapping, or server-port-alert-overlap, is the ratio
between the numbers of alerts to equivalent server ports and the total number
of alerts.
21. Client Port Site Overlapping, or client-port-site-overlap, is the ratio
between the numbers of equivalent client ports and the total number of different
client ports.
22. Client Port Alert Overlapping, or client-port-alert-overlap, is the ratio
between the numbers of alerts from equivalent client ports and the total number
of alerts.
23. Server Address/Port Site Overlapping, or server-addr-port-site-overlap, is
the ratio between the numbers of equivalent server address/port pairs and the
total number of different server address/port pairs.
24. Server Address/Port Alert Overlapping, or server-addr-port-alert-overlap,
is the ratio between the numbers of alerts to equivalent server address/port pairs
and the total number of alerts.
25. Client Address/Port Site Overlapping, or client-addr-port-site-overlap, is
the ratio between the numbers of equivalent client address/port pairs and the
total number of different client address/port pairs.
26. Client Address/Port Alert Overlapping, or client-addr-port-alert-overlap,
is the ratio between the numbers of alerts from equivalent client address/port
pairs and the total number of alerts.
27. Scan Number Ratio, or scan-num-ratio, is the ratio between the numbers of
scans bnumber of distinctive server address/port pairs) of two scenarios.
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28. Scan Rate Ratio, or scan-rate-ratio, is the ratio between the scan rates of two
scenarios.
APPENDIX B
ATTACK AND BACKGROUND TRAFFIC EMULATION IN THE
CONEX TESTBED NETWORK
The CONEX TESTBED network is a network simulation facility setup in the CONEX
lab. of NJIT. This network is designed to emulate the network-based attacks within
a fully controlled environment, to provide abundant clearly-labeled network traces
and system logs to train and test intrusion detection systems, and to evaluate the
real-time detection performance of ID systems.
This chapter introduces the topology and the methodologies of
background/attack traffic simulation in the CONEX TESTBED network. The
topology of the CONEX TESTBED network will be described in Section B.1.
Section B.2 outlines the software tools developed to simulate background and attack
traffic with the CONEX TESTBED. Section B.3 presents the details of an attack
labeling tools, which is designed to generate the detailed attack truth.
B.1 The Network Topology
As shown in Aigure B.1, the CONEX TESTBED network inclicmes the following five
subnets, interconnected by three layer-3 Ethernet Switches:
1. Background Subnet: consists of simulated normal users, who send out service
requests to the servers of the victim network. Several programs have been
implemented to initiate requests automatically according to the preset traffic
configuration so that little human intervention is needed once the programs are
properly configured and start running.
2. Attack Subnet: consists of attackers, who try to break into the servers in
the victim network. Both DoP and P&S attacks are simulated in the CONEX
TESTBED network.
3. Victim Subnet: consists of several servers, which are interconnected with a
Aast Ethernet. These servers provide services for the normal users and they are
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Figure B.1 The topology of the CONEX TESTBED network.
also the targets of the simulated attacks. A packet sniffer is installed within the
victim subnet to collect TCPDUMP files for later analysis.
4. WLAN Subnet: consists of a wireless access point and several mobile stations,
which are interconnected through an IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN. This subnet
will be used as both the background and the victim subnets to emulate the
increasing 802.11 WLAN traffic of both home and business users.
5. MANET Subnet: is an emulated mobile ad-hoc subnet. Instead of setting
up a real ad-hoc network, which is technically and financially impractical in a
laboratory environment, a "virtual" ad-hoc network, which is emulated with
an Ethernet LAN, is used. Intensive R&D efforts are currently undergoing to
design and implement the algorithms to emulate the wireless link over a wireless
network, to simulate the movements of mobile stations using stationary hosts,
and to implement ad-hoc algorithms within a Linux kernel.
At the time when this dissertation is written, the "WLAN" and the "MANET"
subnets are still under construction. Therefore, only those "wired" subnets are used
in attack simulation and data collection currently.
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B.2 The Emulation Tools
This section will concentrate on describing the conceptual and architectural aspects
of the background and attack simulation tools.
Figure B.2 The background traffic generator.
The background traffic generator, Aigure B.2, is the program responsible
for launching normal network traffic using commonly used network applications.
The generator reads the user-specified background configuration information, such
as traffic intensity, the server addresses and the ratio of different applications,
etc, and randomly schedules the network applications. To emulate the Internet
traffic, an "on/off" traffic model is used to generate traffic with high degree of
self-similarities. The background traffic generator can generate traffic using different
TCP/IP protocols, e.g. HTTP bweb browsing), FTP bfile transferring), TELNET
bremote accessing) and SMTP bemail sending and retrieving). The program has been
designed in a way that more applications could be inclicmed easily.
Figure B.3 The attack traffic generator
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The flow diagram of the attack traffic emulation procedure is illustrated in
Aigure B.3. The scenario generator randomly generates the attack scenarios based
on the scenario configuration parameters, such as attack duration, attack types,
attack hosts, victim targets, etc, which are specified by users. The resulted attack
scenarios together with the detailed information about the attack schedules, e.g.
attack commands, parameters, targets, scheduled launching time and so on, are stored
into a scenario file, which is in turn the input of the attack scheduler.
The attack scheduler is responsible for scheduling and launching attacks based
on attack schedule specified in the scenario file. When a scheduled attack is due, the
scheduler will commands a subordinate attack machine to launch the attack. Once
the attack machine finishes the attack, it will send an attack report, which reports
the starting and the ending times as well as the attack status, whether it is successful
or failed, back the scheduler. The scheduler will record all this attack information
into an attack log, which will be used by the attack labeling tool bsee Section B.3) to
generate the detailed attack truth.
B.3 The Attack Labeling Tool
Because there is no standard of the formats of attack logs, different attack simulation
programs use different logging formats. Aor example, the DARPA'98 data set used a
truth list format to keep the information of attack sessions; the DARPA'99 data set
used HTML files to store both the condensed and the detailed attack information;
the DARPA'2000 data set used the IDMEA bIntrusion Detection Message Exchange
Aormat) format to specify the high level attack truth; in the CONEX TESTBED
network, a XML format with a tag set different from the IDMEA format is used to
label both the high-level attack truth and the high-level attack scenario truth.
Due to the diversity and the incompatibilities among these different attack log
formats, it is computationally inefficient and difficult to implement for an intrusion
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detection system to correctly match these logs with various levels of attack details
in the network packets. This tool, Packet Filter, is designed to provide a generic
solution to convert these attack logs of different sources into standard truth formats
so that the problem for an IDS to match network packets and the attack truth could
be greatly standardized and simplified. The "Packet Ailter" needs also be expandable
so that the future models to process new attack log formats can be easily plug into
this tools without major modifications on the other parts of the source codes.
Figure B.4 The system diagram of the packet filter.
The system diagram of the "Packet Ailter" is show in Aigure B.4, in which
inclicmes the following components:
• The Packet Decoder decodes the sniffed packets from either a TCPDUMP
file or a live network.
• The Session Reassembler reassembles the network sessions based on the
decoded packets.
• The Log Parsers parse the input attack logs from various sources into an
internal attack log format and stores the parsed information into the attack
label set.
• The Attack Log Set is the set of parsed attack logs generated by label parser.
• The Packet Matcher matches the packets from the packet decoder and the
sessions from the session reassembler against the attack log set.
• The Output Modules outputs the matched/mismatched packet/sessions and
the attack logs into files or databases in formats specified by users.
Currently, the "Packet Ailter" can parse the attack log files in three different
formats: the DARPA'98 truth format, the partial attack log format and the CONEX
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XML log format. The program can be easily extended to parse attack logs in other
formats by developing a new parser and plugging the parser into the system via a
unified parser registration interface.
The packet filter can output the low-level attack truth in three different formats:
the TCPDUMP binary format, the DARPA'98 truth format and the packet list
format. Similar to the log parsers, the output modules are also extendible via a
standard class inheritance and registration interface.
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